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Nothing is of more immediate practical importance to a lawyer than
the rules that govern his own strategies and maneuvers; and nothing
is more productive of deep and philosophical puzzles than the
question of what those rules should be.1
I. INTRODUCTION
For a long time, arbitration was the only game in town for parties
who wanted more flexibility in the adjudication of their disputes.
They faced a dichotomous choice between accepting the public court
system and its attendant procedural rules or opting out entirely and
resolving their disputes in arbitration.  Private process, however, “has
migrated in surprising ways into the public courts: despite public
rules of procedure, judicial decisions increasingly are based on rules of
procedure drafted by the parties . . . .”2  This sort of private procedural
ordering gives parties the ability to unbundle the off-the-rack proce-
dures applied in public courts and bargain about individual rules.3
Customized procedure, in short, offers parties much of the flexibility
that once seemed the prerogative of arbitration while maintaining the
advantages of public adjudication, including, most significantly, rights
to appeal and public subsidization. While arbitration has arguably be-
1. RONALD A. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72 (1985).
2. Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 507, 510–11 (2011).
3. Private procedural ordering allows parties to bargain over the procedural rules
that will govern the resolution of any disputes that might arise between them in
the future. See, e.g., Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97
VA. L. REV. 723, 724–25 (2011) (describing the process of modifying by contract
the “spectrum of procedure” as private procedural ordering).  Following the lead
of other commentators who have described this form of private ordering, I will
use the terms “private procedural ordering” and “procedural contracting” inter-
changeably. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 593, 598 (2005) (recognizing a movement from “Due Process Procedure to
Contract Procedure”).  Unlike some commentators, however, unless otherwise
specified, I use these terms in the broadest possible sense, to include all party
agreements regarding resolution of their disputes, including procedures that may
be used in courts and extrajudicial procedures and processes such as arbitration,
mediation, med-arb and settlement. Cf. Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 2
(describing contract procedure as “the practice of setting out procedures in con-
tracts to govern disputes . . . that will be adjudicated in the public courts”); Erin
A. O’Hara O’Connor & Christopher R. Drahozal, Carve-Outs and Contractual
Procedure, in Vand. L. and Econ. Res. Paper No. 13-16, at 2 (June 14, 2013)
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2279520 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2279520
[https://perma.unl.edu/C9GT-ZCYM].
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come more like litigation,4 litigation may be becoming more like
arbitration.5
The promise of more flexible public adjudication presents parties
with significant benefits.6  If public procedure is seen as a set of de-
faults rather than immutable or mandatory rules, then parties may
negotiate over the contents not only of their substantive obligations
but also of their preferred enforcement mechanisms.7  A default re-
gime allows parties to design organizational frameworks within which
the integrity of a contractual relationship is decided and maintained,
calibrating accuracy and efficiency to meet their preferences.8  Pre-
dispute procedural contracting allows parties to create additional in-
centives for performance, avoid opportunistic and socially wasteful ex
post litigation spending, and limit risk by leveraging their collective
interests and shared ignorance about what the future may hold.  Post-
4. See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of
Arbitration, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1997) (arguing that arbitration has evolved
into something of a “civil court of general jurisdiction”); Thomas J. Stipanowich,
Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 52 (calling arbitration
the “new litigation”).
5. Douglas Shontz, Fred Kipperman & Vanessa Soma, Business-to-Business Arbi-
tration in the United States, RAND (2011), http://www.rand.org/pubs/techni-
cal_reports/TR781.html [https://perma.unl.edu/9L2Y-P6ZG], at i; see also, e.g.,
Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)build It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the
Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 622
(2007).
6. Indeed, innovating through contract generally is a pervasive phenomenon. See
generally Kevin E. Davis, Contracts as Technology, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 85
(2013) (arguing that contractual innovation is a form of technological progress
that spurs economic growth).
7. For a particularly good introduction to the subject of default rules, see Ian Ayres
& Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (applying game theory to the question of
how lawmakers should create contract default rules to facilitate efficient con-
tracts); see also, e.g., Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contribu-
tions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1391 (1992) (reviewing FRANK
H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW (1991)); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contrac-
tual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992) (discussing the default rule approach to
gap-filling); Jules L. Coleman et al., A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default
Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639
(1989) (applying an economic analysis to default rules); Jason Scott Johnston,
Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100
YALE L.J. 615 (1990) (employing game theory, but challenging Ayres and Gert-
ner’s conclusions); Symposium on Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 3 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (1993) (featuring seventeen pieces on theoretical perspec-
tives on contract default rules).
8. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic
Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 314 (1994) [hereinafter Kaplow, Accuracy in
Adjudication] (showing that heightened accuracy in adjudication can only be ob-
tained at higher costs so an efficient balance has to be struck on a case-by-case
basis).
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dispute procedural contracting allows parties to tailor the adjudica-
tion process in light of their unique and potentially differing evalua-
tions of a dispute in order to constrain litigation expenditures and
mitigate risk.
Given the potential gains from finely tuned procedure, it is puz-
zling that current empirical evidence suggests that few parties explore
the full range of customization theoretically available to them.9  In-
deed, while the evidence we have is far from perfect, it seems to indi-
cate that parties are doing precious little fine-tuning, at least ex ante.
Although parties routinely engage in a few sorts of coarse pre-dispute
customizations—choosing to arbitrate or engage in some other form of
alternative dispute resolution, waiving rights to a jury, picking a law
to govern their deals and selecting a forum for their disputes—it does
not appear that parties regularly attempt more precise calibrations of
procedure. It is less clear how often and to what extent parties may be
engaging in fine-tuning of procedure after a dispute has arisen,
though commentators have speculated that such agreements are simi-
larly rare.10
One key explanation for the relative dearth of fine-grained proce-
dural customization, and the explanation that many commentators
rely on, might be that the practice constitutes a radical departure
from current doctrine.11  It might be that the costs of innovating in the
face of doctrinal norms or trying to change those norms are simply too
steep for any single party to bear, especially given worries about
freeriding.12
This Article evaluates this doctrinal explanation for the puzzle cre-
ated by the gap between the potential gains of customized procedure
and the apparent reality that parties do little of it, at least before a
dispute arises.  It concludes that a close look at the doctrine does not
bear this story out.  To the contrary, while express authorization for
9. See infra Part III.
10. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through
Party Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1342 (2012) (finding few examples of agree-
ments entered into after filing, other than extensions of time for filing and simi-
lar modest adjustments to scheduling); David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke
Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 389, 393 (suggesting that procedure-related
agreements are not as common as generally imagined).
11. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Party Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2014) (arguing that “parties fall at the bottom of the power hierar-
chy” and parties’ attempts “to alter otherwise applicable procedures . . . are
wholly unenforceable absent some legal authorization for judicial enforcement”).
12. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.  Essentially, innovators have a hard
time excluding others from taking advantage of their work.  If the innovation is
valuable, others can copy it easily.  By itself, this problem might dissuade some
potential innovators, who have to spend time and money designing the innova-
tion.  But the free rider problem is exacerbated by the fact that innovators also
disproportionately bear the risks that go along with adopting customizations.
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many forms of customized procedure does not exist, the current trend
of doctrine could not be clearer: courts seem ready to enforce parties’
autonomous procedural choices.  Accordingly, there are minimal risks
that a court will refuse to enforce or abide by a procedural customiza-
tion so long as it does not suffer from some fundamental contract for-
mation flaw, like unconscionability or fraud.
The conclusion reached in this Article leaves the animating puzzle
unsolved.  It also leaves significant and important normative ques-
tions about the desirability of private procedural ordering unan-
swered.  I take up these two matters in separate articles.13  But in this
Article, by precisely articulating the benefits of the practice, surveying
the existing empirical evidence about it and addressing its doctrinal
feasibility in detail, I hope to clear a path to a better understanding of
the promise and peril of procedural contracting.
This Article proceeds in three parts.
In Part II, I analyze the potential efficiency gains for parties from
private procedural ordering.  I begin by rehearsing the basic economic
justifications for procedural rules and then turn to sketching the core
features of current public procedural rules.  Next I outline the benefits
that parties might realize from seeing public procedural rules as de-
faults that can be varied.
In Part III, I present the existing empirical evidence regarding the
degree to which parties seem to engage in procedural contracting.
This evidence, while imperfect, indicates that outside of a few tradi-
tional and relatively coarse areas of customization, parties seem unin-
terested in exploring the promise of fine-tuned procedure, at least ex
ante.  The evidence suggests, however, that parties may be doing more
individualized and tailored procedural contracting ex post.
In Part IV, I evaluate the contention that there are doctrinal limits
to private procedural ordering.  I conclude that, although courts have
not expressly sanctioned many specific forms of procedural customiza-
tion, particularly before a dispute arises, the overall trend of doctrine
supports procedural innovations.
13. I provide an informal model that offers an explanation to the puzzle in H. Allen
Blair, Finely Tuned: Customizing Procedure Through Contract, where I evaluate
when and the extent to which parties rationally might seek to modify default
rules of procedure and conclude that in arms’ length deals, parties are unlikely to
seek radical departures from the defaults.  I then evaluate the normative implica-
tions of procedural contracting in H. Allen Blair, The Line Between Mockery and
Efficiency: The Normative Implications of Private Process, [hereinafter Blair,
Normative Implications] where I conclude that the most concerning objections to
private process map onto general concerns about assent in disparate contracts
generally and thus cannot and should not be viewed in isolation from that larger
subject.
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II. THE GAINS FROM CUSTOMIZED PROCEDURE
Due to these multiple and moving targets, the optimal design of ad-
judication may be more roundabout than building a road up a
treacherous mountain: at least the mountain stands still.14
No two disputes look the same.  The path to resolving each dispute,
then, is unique.  That path will vary based on the substantive law im-
plicated—which in a contract dispute depends not only on default con-
tract rules but also on the parties’ agreement—the procedural rules
applied, the resources each side has and is willing to invest in dispute
resolution, each side’s estimation of the merits of the dispute, and
each side’s sensitivity to risk.  The kaleidoscopic number of combina-
tions of these interrelated elements defies generalization.15
Viewing public procedure as primarily comprised of default rather
than mandatory rules empowers parties to represent their own inter-
ests when confronting an infinitely variable future.  Contractible pro-
cedure rests not only the content of a dispute but also the process by
which a dispute will be resolved on negotiation between the parties.
In other words, procedural customization puts the parties in control,
allowing them to define the scope of the dispute and to specify the
form and substance of the proceedings that will resolve it.  Being
closer to the unique facts and circumstances surrounding their deal,
contracting parties may construct a dispute resolution mechanism
that optimally aligns their incentives, reduces expected dispute reso-
lution costs, and mitigates risk.
The following sections explore these benefits in more detail.  The
first sets the stage by briefly articulating an economic perspective on
procedure generally, showing that procedural rules must strike a bal-
ance between increased accuracy and increased costs, taking into ac-
count the needs of the parties to a dispute as well as the broader
society.  The second then specifically describes several core features of
the current set of procedural rules in public courts.  It argues that the
default rules of civil procedure achieve this balance, in the main, by
relying on standards implemented ex post by adjudicators with the
14. Louis Kaplow, Information and the Aim of Adjudication: Truth or Consequences,
67 STAN. L. REV. 1303 (2015) [hereinafter Kaplow, Truth or Consequences].
15. See, e.g., Samuel C. Damren & Lisa A. Brown, Every Case is Unique, but Com-
mercial Cases Are More So—Don’t Ever Forget That, 93 MICH. B.J., Aug. 2014, at
22, https://www.michbar.org/file/journal/pdf/pdf4article2416.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/58ZT-TWHH] (“There is no single template that adequately de-
scribes—and no single strategy for winning—commercial litigation.  Each case is
different.”); cf. David R. Carlisle & Bruce A. Blitman, Tips for Managing the
“Mega-Mediation,” 67 DISP. RESOL. J., no. 4, 2013, at 1 (“There is no such thing as
a simple or typical mediation.  Every case you mediate will present unique chal-
lenges . . . . Just like snowflakes and fingerprints, no two mediations . . . will be
the same.”).
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benefit of hindsight.  Relying on the first two, the third section con-
nects the dots and outlines some of the efficiency gains that might be
realized through private procedural ordering.
A. Brief Primer on the Economic Theory of Procedure in
Dispute Resolution
Adjudication can be costly.  So what are parties purchasing when
they choose to invest in it?  Most fundamentally, they are buying a
resolution to their dispute.  More precisely, they are hoping to buy a
reasonably accurate resolution to their dispute.  This is where proce-
dure factors into the mix.  In adversarial systems of adjudication, per-
haps the primary role of procedure is to produce results that optimally
enforce the substantive law.16  Optimal enforcement strikes the best
balance possible in a given case between accurate outcomes and the
increased costs of reaching such outcomes.17
Accurate outcomes are valuable not only to the parties—providing
fair, equitable, and hopefully even dignified closure—but to society as
a whole.  So long as adjudicators accurately enforce substantive law,
rational actors expect to face liability to the degree that they behave
unlawfully.  As a result, they conform their behavior to the substan-
tive standard.18  It follows that, to the extent that procedure reduces
the risk of outcome error, it also reduces the incidence of unlawful be-
havior and corresponding social costs.19
Still, accurate outcomes are not all that interest parties or society
at large.  Assuming that the goals of adjudication are fostering produc-
tive activity, restraining harmful conduct and avoiding undue ex-
penses, then the key to assessing the success of adjudication rests on
its consequences, not accuracy per se.20  Perfectly accurate adjudica-
16. See ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
128–48 (2003) (explaining expected error costs and the error cost analysis in more
detail); Todd J. Zywicki & Anthony B. Sanders, Posner, Hayek, and the Economic
Analysis of Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 559–602 (2008).
17. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (balancing the risk of error and
the cost of additional procedure in determining the due process right to an evi-
dentiary hearing).
18. RICHARD A. POSNER, REGULATION (AGENCIES) VERSUS LITIGATION (COURTS): AN
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 11–25 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2011); Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1166 (2001)
(stating that “a primary reason to permit individuals to sue is that the prospect of
suit provides an incentive for desirable behavior in the first instance” and also
noting that in some cases the prospect of suit deters future conduct).
19. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation, 90 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1055, 1058 (2015) (describing how some organizations use information
obtained from litigation to adjust behavior going forward).
20. See, e.g., Kaplow, Accuracy in Adjudication, supra note 8 (arguing that the pri-
mary goal of adjudication should be to incentivize ex ante socially optimal pri-
mary behavior not to achieve accurate outcomes); Kaplow, Truth or
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tive outcomes should, usually, correspond with the best consequences.
But accuracy is expensive, so there is, in the real world, always a
tradeoff.  Sometimes that tradeoff does not pay.  Parties, and society,
have to balance their appetite for accuracy against its increased
costs.21  Procedures designed to reduce outcome error, like extra lay-
ers of appellate review or more searching discovery, necessarily cost
more.22  Moreover, many such procedures create opportunities for a
mismatch between a socially optimal level of investment and private
incentives to overinvest in litigation.23  Because individual parties do
not completely internalize the costs of their litigation choices, and be-
cause such choices take place incrementally over time, the decision to
incur some litigation costs may be individually rational while still be-
ing socially wasteful.24  To achieve proportionality—an optimal level
of litigation investment—any system of procedure must strive to bal-
ance the sum of both parties’ expected process costs against the pri-
vate and social value of enhanced accuracy.25
Consequences, supra note 14, at 1306 (explaining that “[t]he value of truth in
adjudication depends on its consequences, and valuing various outcomes is
outside the realm of truth per se”).
21. Even Professor Solum, who has argued persuasively and passionately that proce-
dural justice requires consideration of more than the tradeoff of costs and accu-
racy acknowledges that this tradeoff is an essential part of procedural justice.
See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. LAW REV. 181, 183
(2004) (noting that procedural justice requires, in part, “a reasonable balance be-
tween cost and accuracy”).
22. See, e.g., Kaplow, Truth or Consequences, supra note 14, at 1335; see also, e.g.,
Jonathan T. Molot, The Feasibility of Litigation Markets, 89 IND. LAW J. 171, 174
(2014) (noting that procedures designed to enhance accuracy often have the oppo-
site of their intended effect, costing too much and accordingly forcing parties to
make second-best litigation choices).
23. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1477, 1486 (1999) (discussing the possibility that parties will either under-
invest or overinvest in the search for evidence, relative to the social optimum).
24. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and
the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 577–78 (1997)
(noting that many litigants consider only the benefits they garner and the costs
they incur and not the benefits of the lawsuit that they do not capture or the costs
that their behavior imposes on others).  As Professors Grundfest and Huang have
demonstrated, parties invest in litigation in increments rather than all at once.
See Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation:
A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1293–98 (2006).  This fact
results in plaintiffs having a counterintuitive incentive, under some conditions, to
file suit in cases in which neither they nor society expect a positive return. See
id. at 1277, 1299–305 (explaining that a lawsuit with a negative expected value is
equivalent to an out-of-the-money call option that a plaintiff will rationally pur-
sue as long as the price of the option is low and the volatility of the claim’s value
is high).
25. See Zywicki & Sanders, supra note 16, at 559–602.  Although dispute resolution
unequivocally implicates the interests of society, particularly in some domains
like civil rights cases, most commentators and the rules themselves seem to pri-
oritize the private interests of the parties.  See, e.g., 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
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So far as the parties themselves are concerned, at least, optimal
resolutions are frequently found in full settlements.26  In fact, much of
the literature on the law and economics of adjudication suggests that
a full settlement is usually a first, best solution for parties.27  As the
old saw goes, a bad settlement is often better than a good trial.28  As-
suming that parties are rational and are not acting strategically to
influence current or future actions of one another or third parties or
alter legal rules,29 they will calculate a settlement value by multiply-
ing the probability of success on the merits in a given case by the
value of an anticipated judgment in that case net of transaction
costs.30  Adjudication should only happen if the plaintiff’s minimum
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1.21[1][a] (3d ed. 2008) (“The application of orderly
rules of procedure does not require the sacrifice of fundamental justice, but
rather the Rules must be construed to promote justice for both parties, not to
defeat it.  This mandate is met if substantial justice is accomplished between the
parties.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination of every action and proceeding”).
26. See, e.g., John Barkai, Elizabeth Kent & Pamela Martin, A Profile of Settlement,
42 CT. REV. 34, 34 (2006) (observing that generally less than 3% of filed cases
reach trial verdict).  Significantly, there is a good deal of debate in the literature
about the socially optimal level of litigation versus settlement. See generally, e.g.,
Steven Shavell, The Level of Litigation: Private Versus Social Optimality of Suit
and of Settlement, 19 INT’L R. L. & ECON. 99 (1999).  The trouble is that when
parties spend on litigation, they do not take into account the costs that such an
action will require of others.  On the other hand, when parties spend on litigation,
they also do not take into account the impact that this will have on incentives to
reduce harm in the future or other positive externalities. See id.  Despite the fact
that the default rules of procedure seem to espouse belief that settlements gener-
ally enhance social welfare, see, for example, FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (requiring
pretrial settlement conferences) and FED. R. CIV. P. 68 (imposing legal costs on a
party who refuses a settlement offer that turns out to have been more favorable
than a trial outcome), several commentators have persuasively argued that, in
some circumstances, settlement can lower social welfare. See, e.g., Ezra Fried-
man & Abraham L. Wickelgren, Chilling, Settlement, and the Accuracy of the Le-
gal Process, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 144 (2010).
27. I distinguish here between a full settlement and various sorts of partial settle-
ments, which are actually forms of ex post procedural contracting. See infra Part
II.C.
28. See, e.g., In re Warner Commc’ns Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), aff’d, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting “the familiar axiom that a bad
settlement is almost always better than a good trial”).
29. See, e.g., Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable
Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 226 (1982) (noting that
problems with figuring out how to divide a settlement surplus may lead to strate-
gic bargaining that undermines the settlement).  This simple model of settlement
also only applies in one-shot cases.  The equation will necessarily look different if
one of the parties is acting to influence third parties or the outcome in future
similar cases or if one of the parties is trying to change the law.
30. According to Posner:
The plaintiff’s minimum offer is the expected value of the litigation to
him plus his settlement costs, the expected value of the litigation being
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settlement value exceeds the defendant’s maximum settlement value
and there is, accordingly, no surplus over which the parties can bar-
gain.31  Generally, such a divide will exist only if the parties have dif-
fering estimates of the probability of success on the merits or differing
estimates of an anticipated judgment.32  Indeed, a substantial number
of commentators and even courts have implied that adjudication re-
sults from grave analytical errors.33  With the goal of aligning the par-
ties’ respective views of the dispute, many of the current default rules
the present value of the judgment if he wins, multiplied by the
probability (as he estimates it) of his winning, minus the present value
of his litigation expenses.  The defendant’s maximum offer is the ex-
pected cost of the litigation to him and consists of his litigation expenses,
plus the cost of an adverse judgment multiplied by the probability as he
estimates it of the plaintiff’s winning (which is equal to one minus the
probability of his winning), minus his settlement costs.
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Ad-
ministration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 418 (1973); see also, e.g., George L. Priest,
Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learning from Wittman’s Mistakes, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 215, 217 (1985).  For the sake of simplicity, my textual formulation
ignores the time value of money, conflates settlement costs and litigation ex-
penses and characterizes them as transaction costs, and assumes that parties are
risk-neutral.  It also does not address the problem of risk versus uncertainty,
where risk can be quantified and uncertainty cannot be.  See FRANK H. KNIGHT,
RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 259 (London Sch. Econ. & Pol. Sci. ed., 7th prtg.
1948) (1921) (“When our ignorance of the future is only partial ignorance, incom-
plete knowledge and imperfect inference, it becomes impossible to classify in-
stances objectively.”).
31. Thomas J. Miceli, Settlement Strategies, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 473, 474 (1998) (“In
the differing perceptions model, a bargaining process is envisioned in which the
parties arrive at a settlement amount somewhere between their reservation
prices.  Thus, when a settlement occurs, the parties share the surplus from
settlement.”).
32. In a simple model of settlement, this leads to the intuitive conclusion that cases
with high transaction costs relative to the stakes are more likely to settle while
cases with low transaction costs relative to the stakes are more likely to proceed
to adjudication. See, e.g., Grundfest & Huang, supra note 24, at 1299–305 (show-
ing how a case with a negative expected judgment value can still have substantial
settlement value); Posner, supra note 2, at 419 n.29 (1973) (asserting that empiri-
cal evidence exists to show that higher stakes cases are more likely to be
litigated).
33. See, e.g., Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) (“In short, settlements rather
than litigation will serve the interests of plaintiffs as well as defendants.”); G.
Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 664 (7th Cir. 1989)
(“Settling litigation is valuable, and courts should promote it.”); Robert Cooter et
al., supra note 29, at 225 (stating that trial “represents a bargaining break-
down.”); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Dis-
putes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1074 (1989) (noting
that trials result from “mistaken prediction[s]” made by parties); Russell
Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An
Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 108 (1994) (noting that most schol-
ars believe “that trials represent mistakes—breakdowns in the bargaining pro-
cess—that leave the litigants and society worse off than they would have been
had settlement been reached”).
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of civil procedure, particularly related to discovery and pretrial man-
agement, work to educate the parties about the likely outcome of any
adjudication.34
Of course, in reality, full settlements are not always reached.  Not
only do parties make analytical errors, but, in the rough and tumble of
actual disputes, there are a number of reasons why even rational par-
ties might reach different expected judgment values and thus choose
to adjudicate rather than fully settle.35  For the purposes of this Arti-
cle, at least three of these reasons are particularly relevant.
First, judging is difficult.36  In the adversarial system, courts make
factual determinations with substantially less than complete confi-
dence, getting information from the self-interested parties.  Courts are
therefore doomed to experience shortages of quality information re-
garding what the relevant facts are.37  As a result, judges, by defini-
tion busy generalists, may have a hard time discerning the wheat
from the chaff.38  The risk of judicial error can be significant and this
risk has to be rolled into the parties’ respective estimate of success on
the merits.39  Parties may not estimate a common base rate, however,
34. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, “To Encourage Settlement”: Rule 68, Offers of Judg-
ment, and the History of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
1561 (2008) (examining the evolution of Rule 68 and its ability to encourage
settlement).
35. See, e.g., Maya Steinitz, How Much Is That Lawsuit in the Window? Pricing Legal
Claims, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1889, 1893–94 (2013) (arguing that valuation of legal
claims is characterized by extreme uncertainty, extreme information asymmetry,
extreme agency problems, and the problem of effort provision).  Of course, parties
may also act irrationally.  Among other things, parties might try to recover sunk
costs and thus make poor investment decisions. See Samuel Issacharoff &
George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J.
73, 113 (1990) (“Although economists exhort decision-makers to ignore sunk costs
and to attend only to the prospective benefits and costs of alternative courses of
action, few attain this ideal.  Instead, individuals often incur further losses
(‘throw good money after bad’) or take great risks in order to recover those
losses.”).
36. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 420, 428 (2007) (arguing that
judges have three sets of “blinders”: informational blinders, cognitive blinders,
and attitudinal blinders).
37. See ALEX STIEN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 34–35, 73–106 (2005) (analyzing
the sources of uncertainty in fact finding); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 4 (2006)
(describing judicial ascertainment of the law as “choice under uncertainty” that
implicates “limited information and bounded rationality”).
38. See, e.g., Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A Preliminary
Defense of How Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal Courts of Ap-
peals, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 407–13 (2013) (describing how federal appel-
late judges spread their deliberative efforts across cases, thereby economizing on
decision making resources).
39. See Lea Brilmayer, Wobble, or the Death of Error, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 367–69
(1986) (stating that errors in both fact finding and applications of the law are
inevitable and explaining why).
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for the probability that a judge will make a mistake, and any differ-
ence they have will ultimately impact their reasonable estimates of
success on the merits.
Second, the scarcity of high quality information impedes the par-
ties’ ability to estimate success on the merits.  The ultimate judgment
that results from adjudication is the product of the parties’ interactive
strategies in presenting evidence to the court.  This presentation oc-
curs incrementally over time.  At least at the outset, the parties are
likely to have asymmetric information about the salient features of
the dispute.  In fact, parties may not have complete access to informa-
tion about their own conduct at the outset of a lawsuit.  In complex
organizations, information is decentralized and held by a variety of
people at different levels separated hierarchically and often geograph-
ically from one another.40  Even as the case progresses and more infor-
mation comes to light, each side’s strategic maneuvering may
undermine the credibility or completeness of the information or
merely reinforce self-serving optimism.41  This noise can make it diffi-
cult for parties to arrive at common present forecasts of the value of a
future judgment.
Third, agency problems or frictions related to agency may stymie
the parties’ ability to accurately forecast adjudicative outcomes.  Of
course, the interests of lawyers and their clients may differ.  A robust
literature discusses the traditional formulation of the principal agent
problem in the context of lawyers and their clients.42  But subtler,
though not necessarily less significant, imbalances of information be-
40. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 19 (arguing that lawsuits help produce informa-
tion for organizations that otherwise would not be available to them).
41. See, e.g., Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85
AM. ECON. REV. 1337, 1338 (1995) (using the same experiment to find causation);
Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 444–50 (1994) (noting that one cost of discovery is the
error in parties’ decision making attributable to the discovery of information that
makes them unduly optimistic or pessimistic about their likelihood of success at
trial); George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pre-
trial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 139 (1993) (finding a positive correlation
between self-serving bias and failure to settle).  The strategic advantages that
can sometimes come with systematic optimism have also been explored. See, e.g.,
Oren Bar-Gill, The Evolution and Persistence of Optimism in Litigation, 22 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 490, 491 (2006) (discussing optimistic lawyers who succeed in ex-
tracting favorable settlements by credibly threatening to resort to costly litiga-
tion); Daniel Klerman & Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Inferences from Litigated Cases, 43 J.
LEGAL STUD. 209, 216–21 (2014) (concluding that a more pro-plaintiff rule might
assign a higher probability of plaintiff success, thus giving a plaintiff a credible
threat to go to trial and convincing the defendant to settle); George L. Priest &
Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17
(1984) (“Where either the plaintiff or defendant has a ‘powerful’ case, settlement
is more likely because the parties are less likely to disagree about the outcome.”).
42. See generally, e.g., James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Character-
ization “Officer of the Court,” 48 BUFF L. REV. 349 (2000); Grace M. Giesel, Client
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tween lawyers and parties, as well as frictions in exchanging informa-
tion, can weaken the accuracy of estimates about the merits of a
dispute.  Parties presumably know more about the facts and circum-
stances surrounding their dispute.  Lawyers presumably know more
about the law and processes that will be used to resolve the dispute.
An accurate forecast of the merits of a dispute depends on a clear pic-
ture and balancing of all three: facts, substantive law, and procedural
law.  But lines of communication between parties and their lawyers
are not always clear and the risk of errors in the exchange of vital
information creates additional hurdles.
In short, adjudication constitutes a nontrivial part of dispute reso-
lution and procedural rules must account not only for settlement ef-
fects but also for the quality of the adjudicatory process itself.
Procedural rules must strive to balance accuracy and efficiency, par-
ticularly in light of the reasons why parties might have differing esti-
mates of the value of their respective positions, while fairly accounting
for the interests of both parties and the larger society.  Designing a set
of procedural rules that accomplishes this difficult balance in the wid-
est swath of cases possible was the animating goal of the current rules
of civil procedure.
B. The Current Default Rules of Procedure
Our existing rules of civil procedure were born during a period of
renewed faith in centralized government as the guardian of social jus-
tice.43  Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act (REA) in 1934.44  The
REA authorized the Supreme Court to create a single procedural re-
gime for federal courts.  The Court, in turn, delegated its task to an
Advisory Committee, which set out to draft a procedural code that lim-
ited the impact of process itself.45  Because the reformers were moved
by pragmatic instrumentalism, they saw procedure exclusively as a
Responsibility for Lawyer Conduct: Examining the Agency Nature of the Law-
yer–Client Relationship, 86 NEB. L. REV. 346 (2007).
43. See Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 A.B.A. J.
1648, 1651 (1981) (“The federal rules [of civil procedure] ultimately were passed
as New Deal legislation.”); Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1272–80 (1997) (describ-
ing influence of New Deal principles such as nationalism, expertise, and social
reform on the Rules Enabling Act).  Notably, the reform effort that led to the REA
began nearly thirty years earlier.  Roscoe Pound popularized the effort in 1906 in
his famous address to the American Bar Association, The Causes of Popular Dis-
satisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906).
44. Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(2012)).
45. Appointment of Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law Rules,
295 U.S. 774, 774–75 (1935).
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means of finding facts and accurately enforcing substantive law.46
Procedure, in other words, was deemed a value-neutral means of en-
forcing substantive rights.47  Procedural rules, the reformers accord-
ingly believed, should be general in nature and “trans-substantive,”
meaning that a single set of rules could apply to all civil cases without
regard to essence of the dispute.48  Uniformity and trans-substantiv-
ity aimed to standardize procedure and achieve, in the aggregate, the
compromise between efficiency and accuracy discussed in the previous
section.49
Practically accommodating the hopeful expansiveness of the ideal
of trans-substantivity, however, was no easy task.  Indeed, designing a
set of fixed rules that could optimally balance accuracy and costs
across an almost infinitely diverse range of future disputes was impos-
sible.  Instead, the reformers opted to entrust judges with broad dis-
cretion to put the rules of procedure into action in individual cases.50
46. See Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal
Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
80–98 (1989); see also, e.g., Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem
for and Celebration of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 PENN. L.
REV. 1791, 1795 (2014) (noting that the Rules, “with their functionalist, anti-for-
malist” underpinnings, committed “to easing barriers to entry through trans-sub-
stantive, uniform, national provisions that expanded opportunities for
information exchange, vested discretion in trial judges, and aimed for efficient
decision making focused on the merits of claims.”).
47. Of course, the myth that procedure was value-neutral and independent from sub-
stance quickly became a concern for many commentators. See generally, e.g.,
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1976); Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a
Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L. J. 718 (1971).
48. Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA.
L. REV. 319, 324 (2008); see also, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An
Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EM-
PIR. L. STUD. 459, 519 (2004) (“Modern procedure has conferred on trial court
judges broader unreviewed (and perhaps unreviewable) discretion.”).
49. See Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 318–19
(1938).  Professor (and later, judge) Clark was perhaps the “dominant intellectual
and operational force” behind the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Jay S. Good-
man, On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: What
Did the Drafters Intend?, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 351, 357 (1987). In Clark’s view,
there were “two basic principles behind” the procedural reform: “all cases should
be decided on their merits rather than on procedural maneuverings and that a
basic goal in litigation should be economy of time and resources.” Id.
50. See, e.g., Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due
Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
1181 (2005) (noting how the Rules retrieved equity as a source of procedural dis-
cretion); Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78
WASH. L. REV. 429 (2003) (arguing for broad use of equitable discretion); Jeffrey
W. Stempel, Complex Litigation at the Millennium: Ulysses Tied to the Generic
Whipping Post: The Continuing Odyssey of Discovery “Reform”, 64 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 197, 232–34 (Spring/Summer 2001) (advocating broad trial judge dis-
cretion to tailor discovery to individual cases).
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“[I]t is only a slight exaggeration to say that federal procedure, espe-
cially at the pretrial stage, is largely the trial judge’s creation subject
to minimal appellate review.”51  In economic terms, the reformers
opted to create a procedural rule set comprised predominately of open-
textured standards rather than rules.52  Accordingly, public procedu-
ral rules in the United States delegate to a judge the task of specifying
precise obligations in light of the contingencies arising after a dispute
has fomented.53  This delegation occurs both expressly and through
the use of vague language inviting flexible interpretation.
51. Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1961 (2006); see also, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An
Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EM-
PIR. LEG. STUD. 459, 519 (2004) (“Modern procedure has conferred on trial court
judges broader unreviewed (and perhaps unreviewable) discretion”).
52. The “rules versus standards” debate has occupied the attentions of scholars for
many years. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, Constitutional Adventures in Wonder-
land: Exploring the Debate Between Rules and Standards Through the Looking
Glass of the First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 830 (1993) (“[T]he amount
of ink spilled over debating the virtues of rules versus standards would lead the
reasonable observer to believe that something momentous was at stake.”).  For
good contemporary discussions of the distinction, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINK-
ING LIKE A LAWYER 13–29 (2009) (discussing the relative advantages and disad-
vantages of legal norms being articulated as rules or standards); Mary C. Daly,
The Dichotomy Between Standards and Rules: A New Way of Understanding the
Differences in Perceptions of Lawyer Codes of Conduct by U.S. and Foreign Law-
yers, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1117, 1124–42 (1999); Jason Scott Johnston, Bar-
gaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256, 258 (1995)
(examining relative efficiency of two-party bargaining under rules and stan-
dards); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 557–68 (1992) (viewing rules and standards for their economic effi-
ciency); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs.
Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 25 (2000) (“Rules establish legal bounda-
ries based on the presence or absence of well-specified triggering facts.”); Kath-
leen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58
(1992) (“Rules aim to confine the decision maker to facts, leaving irreducibly arbi-
trary and subjective value choices to be worked out elsewhere.”).  For purposes of
this analysis, it is enough to say that rules and standards differ only to the extent
to which effort to give substance to a legal command gets expended before or after
a dispute has arisen. See Kaplow, Truth or Consequences, supra note 14.
53. Importantly, these standards tend to remain open-textured over time. See, e.g.,
Bone, supra note 51, at 1970 (“Moreover, case precedent offers little constraint in
this area because balancing tests and discretionary decisions are normally too
fact-specific to support generalizations.”); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Con-
quered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspec-
tive, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 957 (1987) (noting that usually whether precedent
about discretionary Rules of Civil Procedure exists does not function to minimize
discretion).  Precedent, in short, does not operate to harden these standards into
rules. See, e.g., H. Allen Blair, Hard Cases Under the Convention on the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods: A Proposed Taxonomy of Interpretative Challenges, 21 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT’L L 269, 312 (2011) (recognizing the possibility that the value of
open-textured standards could be eroded if they are hardened into rules through
precedent); Kaplow, Truth or Consequences, supra note 14, at 1313 n.10 (“More
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For example, Rule 16 expressly authorizes judges to hold pretrial
conferences and “take appropriate action” with respect to a diverse
range of matters, including pleading, discovery, settlement, summary
judgment, and trial.54  The Rule envisages a key role of a judge as that
of settlement facilitator,55 but it provides almost no substantive gui-
dance, leaving it instead up to an individual judge to effectuate the
goals of “expediting the disposition of the action” and “discouraging
wasteful pretrial activities.”56
Rule 19 is example of a provision that contains such vague lan-
guage as to allow judges wide latitude to decide particular cases.57
Rule 19(a), dealing with compulsory joinder, relies on open-ended lan-
guage, such as “interest” and “impair or impede,” to define the circum-
stances under which an absentee should be joined.  When applying the
Rule to a particular case, a judge has discretion to decide whether the
absentee’s interest is sufficiently significant and whether that interest
would be impaired or impeded if the absentee were not joined.  In
making her decision, the judge can consider a range of case-specific
management considerations in making those decisions.58
There are many other Rules that either expressly delegate discre-
tion to judges or implicitly give judges discretion to put the rules into
effect in particular cases.59  Cataloguing them is beyond the scope of
this Article, but the fundamental point is that “[t]he Federal Rules of
the 1930s are founded upon judicial discretion.”60
C. The Potential Benefits of Procedural Customization
through Contract
Despite the aspirations of the reformers who revolutionized proce-
dure pursuant to the REA, no fixed set of rules could possibly account
for the individual nuances of every case.  Accordingly, as the previous
section pointed out, many of our public procedural rules delegate to
broadly, it is useful to view the creation of precedent as a particular means of
collecting information to give content to the law.”).
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c).
55. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(2) (regarding management); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5) (re-
garding settlement); 3 MOORE ET AL., supra note 25, §§ 16.02, 16.03[1][a] (“Rule
16 is explicitly intended to encourage active judicial management . . . judges are
encouraged to actively participate in designing case-specific plans to position liti-
gation as efficiently as possible for disposition by settlement, motion, or trial.”).
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(1), (3).
57. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a).
58. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b)(1).
59. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 53, at 923 n.76 (1987) (identifying thirty-six provi-
sions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that expressly delegate discretion to
trial court judges).
60. Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional
Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 ALA. L. REV.
133, 201 (1997).
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judges the task of specifying precise obligations after a dispute has
arisen.  Perhaps more importantly, however, the rules also leave liti-
gants with broad discretion in conducting their affairs throughout the
litigation process.61
For instance, after a dispute arises and adjudication has begun,
parties enjoy tremendous flexibility in tailoring discovery processes to
meet their needs, including deciding how much to invest in evidence
production.62  But parties can control the post-dispute contours of pro-
cedure in a variety of other ways as well.63  For example, litigants
may enter stipulations,64 consent to waiver of service of process,65
amend pleadings,66 waive the right to a jury trial,67 substitute a mag-
istrate judge for an Article III District Judge,68 or even waive their
right to appeal.69  Alternatively, parties might settle on the question
of liability, or postpone that question, but continue to litigate the issue
of damages.70  Or parties might enter into a high-low agreement,
61. Bone, supra note 10, at 1330 (“In the American adversary system, litigants enjoy
broad freedom to make their own litigation choices.”); see also STEPHEN C.
YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 138 (7th ed. 2008) (“One of the hallmarks of the U.S.
law is the extent to which the rules of procedure are ‘default’ rules, rules that
govern if the parties have not agreed to something else.”).
62. See FED. R. CIV. P. 29 (providing that “[u]nless the court orders otherwise, the
parties may stipulate” that certain aspects of depositions will be conducted in
particular ways and that “other procedures governing or limiting discovery be
modified”); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Gov-
erning Discovery, in 6 MOORE ET AL., supra note 25, § 26.04[1] (“Parties may mu-
tually stipulate to use procedures for discovery that vary from the rules . . . .”); 8A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 2091–92 (3d ed.
2012) (delineating the parameters of the ability of litigants to stipulate discovery
procedure).
63. For a thorough discussion of post-dispute procedural stipulations, see generally
Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure
Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461 (2007) and J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E.
Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of Civil Settlement, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 59 (2016).
64. See, e.g., 73 AM. JUR. 2D Stipulations § 15.
65. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d) (allowing parties to waive service of process in order to
save money and effort); 4A WRIGHT, MILLER, & MARCUS, supra note 62, § 1092.1
(discussing the process for procuring waiver).
66. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15 (allowing amendment both before and during trial).
67. See FED. R. CIV. P. 39(a)(1).
68. See FED. R. CIV. P. 73.
69. See, e.g., Acton v. Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc., 163 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 1998)
(unpublished table decision) (dismissing appeal based on a post-dispute agree-
ment); see also 15A CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS
§ 3901 (3d ed. 2012) (noting that “the most likely occasion for waiver arises from
a settlement agreement that calls for resolution of some disputed matter by the
district court, coupled with an explicit agreement that the district court decision
shall be final and that all rights of appeal are waived”).
70. See, e.g., Drury Stevenson, Reverse Bifurcation, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 213, 216 (2006)
(explaining “reverse bifurcation” as a process in which the parties have a trial on
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which allows a defendant to put a cap on the upper end possible liabil-
ity (the “high”) in exchange for guaranteeing a minimum payment (the
“low”).71  Of course, finally and most conclusively, parties may resolve
their dispute altogether through a full settlement, giving up claimed
legal rights, on one hand, for some consideration on the other.  By
making any of these post-dispute procedural commitments, litigants
can calibrate their litigation expenditures to meet their individual tol-
erances for risk and accuracy.
Most commentators do not object to party control of litigation after
a dispute has arisen.  Not only is such control expressly allowed by the
rules in many instances,72 but the parties agree to alterations of the
default rules with their “eyes wide open” and with approval of a super-
vising judge.73
Some commentators contrast this sort of ex post party agreement
with an ex ante agreement, suggesting that the latter raises more seri-
ous due process concerns.  But the analytical distance between ex post
modifications and ex ante modifications of public procedures is exag-
gerated.74  As Professors Kapeliuk and Klement have persuasively ar-
gued, any mutual commitment to constrain, extend, or substitute the
set of permissible actions defined by a procedural rule modifies the
procedural rule and hence the litigation game.75  This is true no mat-
ter when the commitment occurs.76  Although in a sense parties ex
post might be in a position to better value certain trade offs that they
are making, this certainty itself comes at its own steep price.  More
information, which leads to the greater certainty, is not free.  Parties
might well trade greater certainty for lower costs ex post.  And, al-
though judicial approval of a customized procedure might be clearer ex
post, a court will always have the opportunity to evaluate, expressly or
impliedly, an ex ante customized procedure as well, policing custom-
damages first and then settle on remaining liability issues once the stakes of the
dispute are understood).
71. High-Low Agreement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
72. See, for example, FED. R. CIV. P. 26, which requires the parties to confer and
results in an agreed upon scheduling order under Rule 16.
73. See Hoffman, supra note 10, at 396.
74. See generally Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Changing the Litigation Game:
An Ex Ante Perspective on Contractualized Procedures, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1475
(2013).
75. Technically, as Professors Kapeliuk and Klement point out, a procedural decision
is different than a procedural commitment.  Some of the default rules of proce-
dure authorize parties to make decisions and when a party makes such a decision
it is not actually changing the litigation game.  But, if a party commits itself to a
particular decision, the litigation game is changed.
76. See id. at 1482 (“An ex ante or an ex post commitment to constrain, to extend, or
to add to the original set of permissible actions defined by the rule modifies the
rule, and thus changes the litigation game that would have taken place absent
such commitment.”).
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ized procedures for due process concerns and fundamental contract
flaws.
Indeed, stripped of the superficial appeal of a distinction between
ex post and ex ante procedural modifications, it becomes evident that
the economic justifications for each rest on the same underlying pre-
mise: parties are in the best position to maximize the “incentive bang
for the enforcement buck.”77 Ex ante procedural contracting simply
extends the logic and the range of potential efficiency gains from ex
post customizable procedure.
To see how, it is worth recapping the path-breaking article Antici-
pating Litigation in Contract Design in which Professors Scott and
Triantis suggest that contracting parties can structure procedural
rules in ways that will increase their joint surplus.78  According to
Professors Scott and Triantis, when dealing with their substantive
contractual obligations, parties may effectively substitute costly and
fact-intensive adjudication for specific rules by varying the precision
of contract provisions.79  When parties choose a relatively precise or
specific rule, they are increasing their ex ante investment.80  In other
words, parties spend more money at the front end of the contracting
process contemplating future contingencies and negotiating over
terms specifying precise obligations in light of those contingencies.
More precise rules require less from the adjudicatory process.  By in-
vesting more at the front end of the process, parties are hoping to lev-
erage the information that they have about their shared contracting
goals and incentives to maximize gains from trade in order to reduce
ex post enforcement costs.81  If a fight arises in the future, a court or
adjudicator should be able to resolve that fight relatively easily and
cheaply in light of the specific rules that the parties have chosen.
On the other hand, when parties choose a relatively open-textured
standard, they are decreasing their ex ante investment and increasing
their expected ex post enforcement costs.82  Rather than spending
time and money worrying about future contingencies and terms speci-
fying precise obligations in light of those contingencies at the front
end of the contracting process, parties are choosing to delegate to a
future tribunal the task of specifying precise obligations.  Such ex post
77. Robert E. Scott & George E. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design,
115 YALE L.J. 814, 856 (2006).
78. Id. at 856–60.
79. See Blair, supra note 53, at 301–02.
80. See Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Con-
tractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1071 (2009).
81. Id. (noting that parties “are exploiting their informational advantage (they know
their contractual ends and have the right incentives to choose the best means to
achieve them), but they are sacrificing the hindsight advantage that a court
might have”).
82. See id.
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or back-end specification is efficient, Professors Scott and Triantis ar-
gue, where the value to the parties of a decision maker’s hindsight
outweighs the value that the parties would gain by specifying ex ante
a more precise rule to govern their contract.83
In short,
[b]y reaching the optimal combination of front-end and back-end costs, parties
can minimize the aggregate contracting costs of achieving a particular gain in
contractual incentives.  Conversely, for any given expenditure of contracting
costs, the parties can reach the highest possible incentive gains by optimizing
the allocation of their investment between the front and back ends.84
This insight reveals the potential of procedural contracting.85  In
fact, Professors Scott and Triantis point out that parties often choose
to opt out of the public adjudicatory system entirely in favor of arbitra-
tion because “the parties’ ex ante agreement as to procedure improves
the cost effectiveness of their prospective enforcement mechanism.”86
They then go on to identify other possible procedural contracting
mechanisms and apply their insights to one example, ex ante modifica-
tions of burdens of proof.87
With respect to burdens of proof, as Professors Scott and Triantis
argue, even if the default allocation can be rationalized,88 “it is highly
unlikely that it yields the efficient . . . allocation for every contract.”89
They go on to show how several different customized allocations might
benefit parties.90
The same fundamental point holds for other procedural rules.
Even to the extent that existing public procedural rules can be ratio-
83. Scott & Triantis, supra note 77, at 819 (“The parties choose between front- and
back-end proxy determination by comparing the informational advantage the
parties may have at the time of contracting against the hindsight advantage of
determining proxies in later litigation.”); id. at 842 (“The parties may view the
court’s hindsight as an advantage or disadvantage depending on how much un-
certainty has been resolved by the time contract performance is due.”).
84. Id. at 817.
85. See also Albert Choi & George Triantis, Completing Contracts in the Shadow of
Costly Verification, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2008) [hereinafter Choi & Triantis,
Completing Contracts] (demonstrating that increasing litigation costs may induce
better incentives to perform contractual obligations); Alan Schwartz, Contracting
About Bankruptcy, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 127 (1997) (discussing the advantages of
contracting over preferred Bankruptcy procedures).
86. Scott & Triantis, supra note 77, at 856.  Part of the reason that arbitration might
be desirable is because it permits vague contractual terms to be interpreted and
enforced by industry experts rather than generalist judges. See id. at 856 n.123
(citing Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation
and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549,
558 (2003) for this proposition).
87. Id. at 857–71.
88. They argue that they are “hard pressed,” along with most other commentators, to
rationalize the default allocation. Id. at 866.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 867–78.
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nalized, it is unlikely that they optimally balance efficiency and accu-
racy in all cases.91  Recall that most public procedural rules are open-
textured standards.  While such standards can and do have value to
parties in some circumstances, more precise rules can also create
value.  Fine-tuning procedure can benefit parties in at least four sig-
nificant and interrelated ways: (1) curbing post-dispute opportunism;
(2) reinforcing substantive obligations and optimizing pre-dispute be-
havior; (3) mitigating risk; and (4) directly reducing the costs of
adjudication.92
1. Curbing Post-Dispute Opportunism
Private procedural ordering can help maximize the joint surplus
from contracting by reducing the expected costs of future disputes.93
Customized procedural rules might achieve this gain by limiting or
eliminating certain kinds of costly post-dispute behavior, such as esca-
lating the costs of discovery or engaging in abusive motion practice or
constraining the range of matters over which the parties might
disagree.94
With respect to both discovery and abusive motion practice, parties
face a collective-action problem.  In a highly simplified model, each
party could choose to be abusive or reasonable with its discovery re-
quests or its motion practice.  Jointly, the parties would be best served
by both acting reasonably.  Individually, however, each party would do
91. This is true even though I presume that most such rules are soundly under-
pinned by a desire to replicate what parties would have chosen for themselves if
they had thought about them—they are, in other words, so-called “majoritarian”
defaults—or they exist in order to protect vulnerable parties or nonparties. See,
e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 7, at 91 (explaining penalty defaults); Alan
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
YALE L.J. 541, 596 (2003) (“The justification for a default rule is that it does for
parties what they would have done for themselves had their contracting costs
been lower.”).
92. For purposes of analysis, it is useful to think about these independently, but in
reality, they are very closely related.  For instance, mechanisms that reinforce
substantive obligations and thus limit the range of future disputes altogether
also necessarily function to curb post-dispute opportunism.  Curbing post-dispute
opportunism functions to reduce overall litigation costs.  Reducing overall litiga-
tion costs mitigates risk.  The fundamental point is that these four benefits are
mutually reinforcing and often positively correlated.
93. See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 481, 500–01 (1994) (discussing how plaintiffs may use discovery strate-
gically to impose costs on the defendant).
94. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Coopera-
tion and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 514–15
(1994); David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought
for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985) (providing a formal
analysis of the impact of nuisance suits); John K. Setear, The Barrister and the
Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse,
69 B.U. L. REV. 569, 584–86 (1989).
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better if it employed abusive techniques while the other was reasona-
ble.  Because both parties know this, and thus know that the other is
likely to defect and employ abusive techniques, they face a Prisoner’s
Dilemma.  The equilibrium is for both parties to defect, acting abu-
sively, even though that leaves them both worse off than if they had
simply acted reasonably.  By binding themselves, in advance of any
dispute, to a more limited slate of discovery options or more limited
motion practice, the parties can reduce the opportunity for this Pris-
oner’s Dilemma to sap individual resources.95
With respect to the range of matters over which parties might disa-
gree, customized procedure might limit the discursive space within
which disputes take place, such as by mandating the use of joint ex-
perts, binding the parties to factual stipulations, or even bifurcating
the adjudication of liability and damages, allowing parties to gain in-
formation about the stakes of a dispute before considering the ques-
tion of liability.96  Each of these mechanisms allows parties to short-
circuit incentives for one side or the other to engage in jointly wasteful
posturing or distraction tactics.97  Parties can focus a future fact
finder on the issues that are most relevant or most likely to be
relevant.
Other mechanisms are also imaginable,98 but at bottom, procedu-
ral contracts can limit or raise the expected costs of future disputes by
preventing parties from strategically gaming the asymmetry between
what the parties can observe and what a court can verify.99  By delim-
95. The same logic could apply to waivers of the right to appeal.  Parties might well
dispense with a right to appellate review, even before a dispute arises, because
they believe that the collective value of enhanced accuracy is not worth the costs.
96. See, e.g., Drury Stevenson, Reverse Bifurcation, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 213, 216 (2006)
(discussing bifurcation of damages and liabilities).
97. As Gordon Tullock argued years ago, error costs are likely to be higher in more
adversarial systems. See Gordon Tullock, The Case Against the Common Law, in
9 THE SELECTED WORKS OF GORDON TULLOCK 422 (C.K. Rowley ed. 2005) (“[The
adversary system] places little or no value on searching for the truth.  It is a
combat system in which winning is the sole objective.”).  Professor Tullock’s mod-
els analyzed this issue in a binary manner, comparing inquisitorial systems with
the American adversarial system, but through various issue limiting agreements,
parties can reduce the space within which the adversarial contest takes place and
garner many of the error reduction and perhaps rent-seeking reduction benefits
that Professor Tullock associated with inquisitorial systems of adjudication. See,
e.g., id. at 423 (suggesting that there is no reason to believe that self-interested
parties competing in the litigation process will bring a social benefit).
98. For example, fee-shifting agreements and burden-shifting agreements could also
raise the price of brining non-meritorious or speculative claims and thus limit
opportunities for extortionate lawsuits, thus actually reducing the overall ex-
pected costs of dispute resolution.
99. Information may be said to be observable if the other contracting party can per-
ceive it.  Information may be observable but not verifiable if the other party can
perceive it but cannot, at a reasonable case, prove that information to a court or
other third party. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite
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iting through contract, usually before a dispute arises, the range of
strategic procedural choices or the space within which a dispute can
occur, the parties may be able to enhance the overall value of their
agreements.
2. Reinforcing Substantive Obligations
A key ex ante goal of contracting in general is reducing the likeli-
hood of a dispute occurring in the first instance.  Pre-dispute procedu-
ral contracting also provides parties with additional means of
reinforcing or defining their substantive obligations to and behavior
towards one another.  The divergence between ex ante and ex post opti-
mal litigation decisions has been extensively analyzed in the law and
economics literature.100  Suffice it to say that procedural rules impact
how parties evaluate their post-dispute payoffs and thus impact when,
or if, parties assert their claims and how they make strategic choices
during litigation.101
Parties already regularly negotiate over substantive terms that
might be difficult to verify in subsequent litigation.  For example, par-
ties often include terms that condition on vague or difficult to prove
states like “best efforts.”  The high costs of proving (or disproving)
these states in court can function as a disincentive for parties to bring
a claim and, at the very least, negatively impact the expected value of
any claim.  Parties might conversely contract for very precise obliga-
tions that are easily verifiable in court.  Such terms can function to
dissuade opportunistic shirking or holdups during performance of the
contract.  Alternatively, they can deter parties from filing nuisance
claims or claims that have only marginal factual support.  Such gains
Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1642 n.2 (2003); see also Lisa Bernstein,
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1791–95 (1996) (discussing the distinc-
tion between observable information, which is information that it is both possible
and worthwhile for transactors to obtain, and verifiable information, which is
information that it is worthwhile for transactors to prove to a designated third-
party neutral in the event of a dispute).  Parties often include in their contracts
terms that might be cheap to observe but costly to verify. See Choi & Triantis,
Completing Contracts, supra note 85; Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic
Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L. J.
848 (2010); see also, e.g., Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of
Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 150, 150–63 (1995); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–15
(1994).
100. See generally, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 392–401 (2004); Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the
Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575
(1997).
101. See, e.g., Kapeliuk, supra note 74, at 1482–83 (noting that just as the prospect of
full settlement has an impact on the selection of cases that are litigated, so too
does the choice of procedural rules).
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can be realized by reducing the likelihood of future litigation alto-
gether or by narrowing the range of disputes in any future litigation.
But pre-dispute procedural contracting offers parties even more
options for calibrating their substantive obligations to one another
and optimizing behavior.  Aware of the rules that will govern any fu-
ture disputes at the time of contracting, and knowing that these rules
will affect their litigation behavior and the outcome of litigation, par-
ties can tailor their respective pre-dispute actions.102  For instance,
agreeing that expert testimony or an expert opinion will be given by a
neutral third party rather than through party-appointed advocates
could incentivize greater compliance with performance standards pre-
dispute or, at the least, change the parties’ incentives in deciding what
claims to bring and how much to invest in proving claims once they
have been asserted.103  Agreeing to give a defendant the right to exer-
cise an option making any settlements unenforceable could reduce liti-
gation holdup problems, eliminating the incentive for plaintiffs to
bring negative expected value lawsuits.104  Or, opting into expanded
review of arbitral awards could be seen as a means of increasing accu-
racy (and costs) and thus deterring more questionable claims.105
Pre-dispute procedural contracting also provides the parties with
additional means to signal credibly about reliability, propensity for lit-
igation, or other similar matters.  For instance, a manufacturer could
signal confidence in its product by offering to bear the burden of proof
in any lawsuit for breach.106  Or, to borrow an example from another
102. Procedural contracting, in other words, can help overcome the “acoustic separa-
tion” between the ex ante understanding that parties have about how their future
disputes will be adjudicated and their ex post understanding. See, e.g., Meir Dan-
Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal
Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984); see also, generally, Bruce Hay, Procedural Jus-
tice: Ex Ante Vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803 (1997).
103. See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (in
a settlement between competitors, parties agreed to submit any future dispute
involving an advertised claim of data based comparative superiority to a neutral
third party expert to provide a non-binding opinion); Bone, supra note 10, at 1356
(offering a similar example).
104. See generally, e.g., David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Solution to the Problem
of Nuisance Suits: The Option to Have the Court Bar Settlement, 26 INT’L REV. L.
& ECON. 42 (2006).
105. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Correction, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 379 (1995).
106. A variety of other customizations to burdens of proof can also be envisaged.  A
rich literature exists exploring the connections between the burden of proof, risk
of error, primary behavior, and cost of litigation. See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay &
Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective,
26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1997) (analyzing burden of proof as an instrument for
reducing the cost of litigation); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distor-
tionary Effect of Evidence on Primary Behavior, 124 HARV. L. REV. 518 (2010)
(explaining people’s primary behavior as motivated by the burdens of proof and
other evidentiary requirements); Posner, supra note 23, at 1502–07 (using the
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context, Professors Daphna Kapeliuk and Alon Klement suggest that
a prospective tenant might signal reliability by agreeing to let the
landlord quickly obtain provisional relief in the event of a default.107
These simple examples do not exhaust the numerous possibili-
ties.108  Essentially, procedural contracting simply illustrates the
“well-appreciated general conclusion that a party may benefit by re-
moving future options, since this form of commitment can have advan-
tageous incentive effects.”109  Parties can use customized procedural
devices in combination with carefully tailored substantive obligations
to incentivize pre-dispute behaviors that increase their joint con-
tracting surplus.
3. Mitigating Risk
Litigation can be risky.  Parties often find themselves wedged be-
tween climbing costs and unpredictable awards.  Of course, if the risk
premium of pursuing litigation exceeds whatever gains a party ex-
pects, that party should be willing to fully settle.  But, as previously
discussed, there are many reasons why parties might want to cabin
the riskiness of dispute resolution but still continue their fight.110  Va-
rious forms of procedural contracting can function to hedge against
outlier outcomes, providing a benefit for both parties.
For instance, parties might opt to waive a jury.  Although use of a
judge as a factfinder may also reduce the overall costs of adjudication
by eliminating the time and effort that goes into empaneling a jury
and streamlining presentation of evidence, perhaps the most impor-
economic analysis of the burden of proof as a tool for reducing the cost of errors
and error-avoidance as a total sum); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in
Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV.
849, 861–67 (1984) (carrying out economic analysis of the burden of proof and
identifying the limits of the “preponderance” standard in tort cases with uncer-
tain causation); Chris W. Sanchirico, Games, Information, and Evidence Produc-
tion: With Application to English Legal History, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 342 (2000)
(developing an account of proof burdens that uses evidence production as a proxy
for determining the harmfulness of primary behavior); Chris W. Sanchirico, Rely-
ing on the Information of Interested—and Potentially Dishonest—Parties, 3 AM.
L. & ECON. REV. 320 (2001) (analyzing the proof burdens’ effect on primary
behavior).
107. Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contractualizing Procedure 3, 24–25 (Dec. 31,
2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (suggesting that parties can
signal private information by agreeing to custom procedural clauses).
108. See generally, e.g., Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contracting Around
Twombly, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2010) (discussing possible advantages of modify-
ing the Twombly pleading standard by contract).
109. Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 104, at 43 (noting that a stock example of this
maxim is “that an advancing army might want to burn bridges behind it, so that
its troops will fight aggressively and that the enemy will take heed of this”).
110. See infra Part II.A.
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tant reason parties choose to try a case to a judge is that judges may
also be more predictable and conservative decision makers.111
More innovatively, parties might reach some form of award-modifi-
cation agreement.112  Most commonly, such modifications take the
form of so-called high-low agreements, in which a defendant agrees to
pay the plaintiff a minimum recovery in return for the plaintiff’s
agreement to accept a maximum amount regardless of the outcome of
the trial.113  Such agreements could be simple, with two payoff alter-
natives, or more complicated, with multiple payoffs contingent on va-
rious outcomes.114  It is even possible to imagine an award
modification in which the function is continuous and differentiable
across outcomes.  For example, a defendant might offer to compensate
a plaintiff with a fixed transfer payment plus 25% of whatever a jury
ultimately awards in exchange for the plaintiff giving up its opportu-
nity to capture the full amount of a jury award.115
4. Reducing the Direct Costs of Litigation
Litigation can, of course, be expensive.  Avoiding wasteful, offset-
ting litigation expenditures after a dispute has already arisen may be
a key goal for parties to procedural contracts.  In a sense, this goal is
an analogue to the first—curbing post-dispute opportunism.  In many
instances, the symmetrical lack of knowledge about the future may
make it easier for parties to lash themselves to the mast, as it were,
and commit before a dispute to avoiding opportunistic exploitation of
one another.  But even after litigation has commenced, the threat of
excessive costs may inspire parties to come up with ways to reduce
their effort and increase efficiency.116
111. A sizeable literature addresses the possibility that juries are less predictable and
more extreme in their decisions. See, e.g., John Lande, Failing Faith in Litiga-
tion? A Survey of Business Lawyers’ and Executives’ Opinions, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 1, 21, 33–34 (1998) (presenting evidence from interviews and surveys sug-
gesting that juries are less accurate and more extreme); Cass R. Sunstein, Delib-
erative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 102–03 (2000)
(discussing reasons why juries might be more extreme).
112. See Prescott, supra note 63, at 85–98 (discussing in detail various forms of award
modification agreements).
113. J.J. Prescott et al., Trial and Settlement: A Study of High-Low Agreements, 57
J.L. & ECON. 699, 700 (2014).
114. See, e.g., Prescott, supra note 63, at 92 (citing Verdict and Settlement Summary,
Clemente v. Duran, No. L-003405-04, 2006 WL 4643243 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. Dec. 18, 2006) in which the parties agreed to a three-tiered set of payoffs
dependent on how much fault a jury attributed to the defendant).
115. See id. at 94 (offering a similar example).
116. See Prescott et al., supra note 113, at 728–30 (recognizing further that “parties
may not need high-low agreements to limit excessive rent seeking when they can
do so directly through explicit contractual limitations on [litigation] activities
that are costly”).
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At the simplest, parties can and do modify procedure by adjusting
the timing and other pedestrian aspects of litigation.  These minor
procedure-modification agreements reduce costs by allowing the par-
ties to disperse their obligations sensibly, avoiding what can be an ex-
pensive bunching of deadlines or what can be an inefficient overlap of
deadlines.  But parties go further than this and often simplify or
streamline the process by which their dispute will be resolved in addi-
tional ways, such as waiving rights to present oral testimony and
treating a summary judgment proceeding as a trial on the merits,
agreeing to a trial on stipulated facts, agreeing to expedited trials with
a magistrate judge, waiving rights to appeal, and similar agreements.
These sorts of commitments to procedural modifications, although
taking place after a dispute has arisen, function in much the same
way as pre-contractual modifications do.  These commitments trade
off procedural rights provided by the default rules of civil procedure
that one or both parties may have for other perceived or real benefits,
essentially making those procedural rights alienable.
III. THE LIMITED EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Several commentators have conducted empirical evaluations of the
degree to which parties engage in various forms of procedural con-
tracting.117  For the most part, these commentators focus their atten-
tions on a limited subset of possible procedural customizations,
looking for evidence about how frequently parties incorporate specific
provisions into their deals.  Accordingly, their methodologies and con-
clusions are not precisely the same.  Nevertheless, the overall picture
presented by these empirical studies suggests that even sophisticated
commercial parties rarely engage in fine-grained procedural cus-
tomization, at least before a dispute arises.118  To be sure, several
117. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or
Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 433, 449–67 (2010)
(analyzing material contracts filed with the SEC); Christopher R. Drahozal &
Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure: Carve-Outs from Arbitration
Clauses, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1945, 1972 (2014) (compiling a sample of a variety of
contracts filed with the SEC); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante
Choices of Law and Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agree-
ments, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1983–94 (2006) (analyzing merger agreements
filed with the SEC); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from
Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts
of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335 (2007) (analyzing material
contracts filed with the SEC); Hoffman, supra note 10, at 403–16 (studying CEP
employment contracts); Erin O’Hara O’Connor et al., Customizing Employment
Arbitration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 133, 136–37 (2012) (same); W. Mark C. Weidemaier,
Customized Procedure in Theory and Reality, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1865
(2015) (collecting contracts that were exhibits to SEC filings).
118. See, e.g., Weidemaier, supra note 117, at 1889.
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coarse forms of customization are common—choice of law clauses,119
forum selection clauses,120 clauses choosing arbitration,121 clauses
choosing arbitration but providing some sort of “carve-outs” that allow
parties to go court in some subset of disputes,122 jury trial waivers,123
and sometimes attorney fee provisions.124  But “[w]hat parties almost
never do is write contracts that dictate procedure at the granular level
of pre-trial and trial practice.”125  The majority of contracts, it seems,
do not address matters of pleading, discovery, the rules of evidence,
burdens of proof, or other more innovative forms of procedural
customization.
For a variety of reasons, this empirical evidence may be somewhat
suspect.  As Christopher Drahozal and Erin O’Hara O’Connor have ar-
gued, customization commonly occurs through carve-outs from arbi-
tration protocols.126  These carve-outs are hard to detect in standard
searches and the databases of commercial contracts containing arbi-
tration carve-outs is limited.  Moreover, with the exception of the com-
119. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 117, at 1987 tbl.2 (all merger agree-
ments in sample designate governing law); see also Hoffman, supra note 10, at
410 (finding over 1,000 contracts each year in text-based search of SEC material
contracts).
120. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical
Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’
Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1504 tbl.11 (2009) (finding that 38.9% of a
sample of commercial contracts included choice of forum clause); Eisenberg &
Miller, supra note 117, at 1987 (finding that 52.5% of a sample of merger agree-
ments included choice of forum clause); see also Hoffman, supra note 10, at
407–08 (concluding based on text search of SEC filings that “a plurality of con-
tracts choose forum”).
121. See, e.g., Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, supra note 117, at 1973 (finding that
47.5% of a sample of technology contracts included an arbitration clause, again
with substantial variation across contract type); O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra
note 117, at 161 tbl.1 (2012) (finding that 51.5% of a sample of CEO employment
contracts required arbitration of some or all disputes).
122. For example, O’Hara O’Connor et al. found such carve-outs in nearly half of a
sample of CEO employment contracts.  O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 117, at
167–68.  Likewise, Drahozal and O’Hara O’Connor found routine use of carve-
outs in arbitration clauses in samples of joint venture, technology, and franchise
agreements.  Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, supra note 117, at 21–31.
123. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Do Juries Add Value?: Evidence from
an Empirical Study of Jury Trial Waiver Clauses in Large Corporate Contracts
(Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06-
044, 2006), http:// ssrn.com/abstract=946465 [https://perma.unl.edu/NWS7-
Z3YM] (finding about 20% of 2,800 commercial contracts contained jury trial
waivers, although also finding substantial variance across contract type, ranging
from 1.9% to 64.5%).
124. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American
Rule on Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 COR-
NELL L. REV. 327, 350–52 (2013) (finding that 37.1% of the contracts in their sam-
ple adopted the American rule, while 36.4% adopted the English rule).
125. Weidemaier, supra note 117, at 1938.
126. Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, supra note 117, at 1949–50.
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prehensive survey conducted by Professor Weidemaier, who collected
a dataset of over 400 contracts and hand coded them, most of the ex-
tant studies rely on text searches that may well overlook more
nuanced customized terms.127
Nevertheless, while the empirical evidence we have may not be
perfect, it seems to point in the same direction—parties do not seem to
engage in robust customization of procedure.  Considering the impres-
sive value-maximizing opportunities presented by procedural cus-
tomization, as discussed in Part II, this empirical evidence is puzzling
to say the least.
IV. THE DOCTRINALLY PERMISSIBLE OPTIONS FOR
CALIBRATING PROCEDURE THROUGH CONTRACT
Any customer can have a car painted any colour that he wants so
long as it is black.128
The question is why parties seem not to engage in procedural cus-
tomization.  One important part of the answer is that only parties who
have a primary contractual relationship are likely to be able to bar-
gain for customized procedures as an ancillary part of their agree-
ment.  Parties are unlikely to bargain ex ante for procedural contracts
in isolation.  If this intuition is correct, then only a limited subset of all
disputes in courts would even have the potential of implicating cus-
tomized procedures.129
As important as this answer is, however, it does not account for the
dearth of procedural innovation and fine-tuning within the remaining
set of disputes where customization could occur.  It is possible, of
course, that parties are stuck using suboptimal defaults for any num-
ber of reasons.  But the first, and perhaps most fundamental as many
commentators suggest, is that the practice of procedural customiza-
tion might constitute a radical change to current doctrinal norms.130
127. See Weidemaier, supra note 117, at 1871.
128. Moffitt, supra note 63, at 462 (2007) (arguing that “[o]ur judiciary has unfortu-
nately embraced Henry Ford’s sense of consumer choice” with respect to litigation
procedural rules).
129. See, e.g., U.S. District Courts—Judicial Business 2014, U.S. COURTS, http://
www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2014/us-district-courts.aspx
[https://perma.unl.edu/DA34-254G] (showing that less than 10% of civil cases
filed in federal court over the past five years are categorized as contract dis-
putes); Examining the Work of State Courts: An Analysis of 2010 State Court
Caseloads, CT. STATISTICS PROJECT (Dec. 2012) http://www.courtstatistics.org/
other-pages/~/media/microsites/files/csp/data%20pdf/csp_dec.ashx [https://
perma.unl.edu/LYW4-F6VS] (showing that in seventeen general jurisdiction
courts approximately 61% of civil cases filed in 2010 were contract disputes).
130. See generally, e.g., Dodson, supra note 11.  Importantly, in this Article, I do not
address a related and important question: when, if ever, is the practice of proce-
dural customization normatively desirable or permissible.  I take up this question
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The costs of innovating in the face of those norms or trying to change
those norms might simply be too steep for any single party to bear,
especially given worries about freeriding.131
Historically, in fact, courts were skeptical of private procedural or-
dering, preferring to limit parties to the off-the-rack set of rules sup-
plied by the sovereign.132  Party-driven rulemaking was seen as a
dangerous threat the legitimate public function of courts.133  This
wary view of nonjudicial, nonpublic dispute resolution is perhaps most
evident in the way that courts treated arbitration during the nine-
teenth and much of the early twentieth centuries.  Essentially, courts
refused to enforce nonjudicial modes of dispute resolution.134  Using
the same logic, they also effectively prevented private parties from al-
tering or opting out of almost all procedural rules in public judicial
proceedings.135
Eventually, however, beginning with a grudging acceptance of ar-
bitration and the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), but
really gaining momentum under Chief Justices Warren and Burger,
judicial tides began to turn.  Through an expanding array of private
procedural ordering options, courts have steadily allowed parties more
in a forthcoming article, H. Allen Blair, The Line Between Mockery and Efficiency:
The Normative Implications of Private Process. See Blair, Normative Implica-
tions, supra note 13.
131. See supra note 11.  Essentially, innovators have a hard time excluding others
from taking advantage of their work.  If the innovation is valuable, others can
copy it easily.  By itself, this problem might dissuade some potential innovators,
who have to spend time and money designing the innovation.  But, the free rider
problem is exacerbated by the fact that innovators also disproportionately bear
the risks that go along with adopting customizations.
132. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 599–600 (1997) (noting that
judges were either wary of quality of justice available in arbitration or—because
they were paid on per case basis—protective of their own pocketbooks).
133. Several scholars have suggested that at least some of this hostility towards pri-
vate procedural ordering might have been less high-minded.  Professor Alan Scott
Rau, for instance, has suggested that courts’ traditional hostility to arbitration
may have “originated in considerations of competition for business, at a time
when judges’ salaries still depended on fees paid by litigants.” ALAN SCOTT RAU,
ARBITRATION 57 (2d ed. 2002); see also JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION AND THE LAW 83 (1918) (recognizing the judicial competition with private
tribunals and the fear that arbitration threatened a significant source of judicial
business, as well as judicial jobs linked to the courts’ caseloads).
134. The history of arbitration itself has been difficult to completely uncover. See, e.g.,
Douglas Yarn, A Cautionary Tale of Isomorphism Through Institutionalism, 108
PENN. ST. L. REV. 929, 937 (2004) (“It is a matter that seems to fall in the gap
between social and legal historians.”).  The fundamental point, however, is that
courts were highly skeptical of non-judicial forms of dispute resolution.
135. But see Michael H. LeRoy, Crowning the New King: The Statutory Arbitrator and
the Demise of Judicial Review, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 20 (surveying treatises and
concluding that “English and American colonial courts were neither hostile nor
blindly deferential to arbitration”).
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and more freedom to tailor process and procedure in order to increase
certainty while efficiently adjusting accuracy to fit with their ex ante
preferences.136
The first two subsections below briefly trace the evolution of the
law governing private procedural ordering, focusing primarily on the
U.S. Supreme Court.  The third subsection looks at trends in lower
courts and state courts.  In total, these sections demonstrate that good
reason exists to believe that courts would enforce a wide range of pro-
cedural contracts.  Although some uncertainty persists about the con-
tractibility of specific procedural rules, a clear trend favoring parties’
ability to structure their own procedural paths exists.
A. Procedure as Public Law: Historic Skepticism of Private
Procedural Ordering
Until the early twentieth century, courts protected their turf.  They
tended to see efforts by parties to provide for most noncourt dispute
resolution, as well as other forms of private procedural ordering, as
infringements on the proper public role of the court system.137  As one
commentator has observed, there existed “a taboo against party au-
tonomy in procedural matters.”138  Courts primarily relied on two in-
terlacing doctrines—the revocability and ouster doctrines—to prevent
procedural contracting.  Perhaps not surprisingly, both doctrines
arose out of a judicial skepticism of arbitration, though at least the
ouster doctrine expanded over time to bar other forms of private proce-
dural ordering as well.
The revocability doctrine sprung into existence, near full gown,
from dicta in Lord Edward Coke’s 1609 opinion in Vynior’s Case.139
There, the parties had entered into a contract for repair work on sev-
eral buildings.140  They agreed to submit any disputes about the work
to arbitration, and, as was customary during the period, a perform-
136. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Accuracy in Adjudication, supra note 8, at 310 (arguing
that heightened accuracy in adjudication can only be obtained at higher costs so
an efficient balance has to be struck on a case-by-case basis).
137. See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in
American Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1947 (1996) (recognizing that prior to the
early twentieth century, the traditional view was that if courts were to function
as the national source of justice, there was no room for “makeshift, party-con-
fected modes of dispute resolution”); Reuben, supra note 132, at 599–600 (noting
that judges were either wary of quality of justice available in arbitration or—
because they were paid on per case basis—protective of their own pocketbooks).
But see LeRoy, supra note 135, at 20 (surveying treatises and concluding that
“English and American colonial courts were neither hostile nor blindly deferen-
tial to arbitration”).
138. Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual
Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 294 (1988).
139. Vynior’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 595, 599–600 (K.B. 1609).
140. See id.
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ance bond secured this agreement.141  The plaintiff brought a court
action, seeking to recover on the bond as well as to recover damages.
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had failed to comply with the
arbitration agreement.142  Lord Coke ruled that when there was a suit
on a bond securing a submission to arbitration, the submission itself
was revocable although the price of revoking was forfeiture of the
bond:
[a]lthough . . . the defendant, was bound in a bond to stand to, abide, observe,
etc., the rule, etc., of arbitration, etc., yet he might countermand it, for one
cannot by his act make such authority, power, or warrant not countermandable
which is by the law or of its own nature countermandable.143
Whatever Lord Coke’s original intent,144 Vynoir’s became a leading
case “establishing the revocability doctrine.”145  Pursuant to this doc-
trine, a party to an arbitration agreement could revoke an arbitrator’s
authority at any time before the arbitrator rendered an award, even if
the parties had agreed the delegation was irrevocable.146  Although
U.S. courts would usually enforce arbitration awards once issued,147
following the practice of their English counterparts, they would not
generally enforce executory contracts to arbitrate.148  Practically, this
141. See id. The common law of contract was just beginning to form at the time, so
bonds often secured contractual promises. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Paul Y.
Castle, The Revocability of Contract Provisions Controlling Resolution of Future
Disputes Between the Parties, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 207, 208 (2004) (noting
that “the common law of contracts was in its infancy” at the time that Vynior’s
Case was decided).
142. See id.
143. Vynior’s Case, (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 595, 601–02 (K.B.) (emphasis added).
144. Some commentators have suggested that Lord Coke was effectively relying on
agency principles to find that the principle could revoke the agent’s authority at
any time. See, e.g., Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law,
37 YALE L.J. 595, 598–99 (1928).  Professors Paul Carrington and Paul Castle
have compellingly, pointed out, however, that the concept of agency had not de-
veloped fully when Vynoir’s Case was decided. See Carrington & Castle, supra
note 141, at 210.  They contend, instead, that Lord Coke was likely motivated by
a desire to “insure the disinterest of arbitrators” at a time when there were no
real substantive constraints on arbitrator authority. Id.
145. Harry Baum & Leon Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration
Agreements in the Federal Courts, 8 N.Y.U. L.Q. 238, 240 (1930); see also, e.g.,
Sayre, supra note 144, at 602 (stating that Vynior’s Case has “generally been
regarded as the original and controlling authority for revocability”).
146. See, e.g., Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845)
(citing Vynior’s Case as authority for the proposition that arbitration submissions
are revocable regardless of a stipulation to the contrary because one “cannot alter
the judgment of law, to make that irrevocable, which is of its own nature
revocable”).
147. See, e.g., Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349 (1854).
148. See, e.g., Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120–21 (1924) (“The fed-
eral courts—like those of the states and of England—have, both in equity and at
law, denied in large measure, the aid of their processes to those seeking to en
force [sic] executory agreement to arbitrate disputes.”); Jeffery W. Stempel, Pit-
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meant that a party to an arbitration agreement faced continual risk
that her counterparty would renege on his promise and exercise his
right to demand that a court hear any disputes.
Although the revocability doctrine alone did not necessarily create
an insuperable barrier to arbitration or other forms of procedural con-
tracting, it mutated over time into the so-called ouster doctrine.  The
mutation can be traced to an eighteenth century English decision, Kill
v. Hollister.149  There, while interpreting the revocability doctrine, the
court allowed a judicial action over an insurance policy to proceed de-
spite an arbitration clause on the grounds that “the agreement of the
parties cannot oust this court [of jurisdiction].”150  The revocability
doctrine, then, allowed courts to ignore the parties’ delegation of au-
thority to an arbitrator.  As with the dicta giving rise to the revocabil-
ity doctrine itself, no authority was given for this “ouster” rule.151
Nevertheless, by 1856, the rule had become justified as legitimate “ju-
dicial jealousy” over jurisdiction, and this explanation for it stuck.152
The ouster doctrine began as anti-arbitration rule, but it quickly
expanded into a more general principle precluding courts from enforc-
ing various contractual provisions limiting redress in courts.  In Home
Insurance Co. v. Morse, for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
an agreement by which an insurance company waived its right to re-
move state cases to federal courts was not enforceable.153  The Court
analogized the matter to a jury trial waiver and an arbitration agree-
ment, concluding that
falls of Public Policy: The Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 259,
272 (1990).  This rule was incorporated in the First Restatement of Contracts as
well. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 550 cmt. A (1932) (“A bargain to arbi-
trate, though it is not illegal, is practically unenforceable. . . .”).  Of course, even
at the height of its power, the revocability doctrine had exceptions. See, e.g., Red
Cross Line, 264 U.S. at 122–25 (1924) (finding that New York courts could equita-
bly enforce arbitration agreements in their own courts under New York’s arbitra-
tion statute).
149. Kill v. Hollister, (1746) 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B.).  Notably, some commentators
have suggested that the inverse historical evolution occurred: the ouster doctrine
preceded the revocability doctrine. See, e.g., Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Day-
ton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 283 (1926) (explaining
revocability as “rooted originally in the jealousy of courts for their jurisdiction”).
The order of development is not particularly significant for purposes of my
argument.
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. See Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) (citing Scott v.
Avery, (1856) 10 Eng. Rep. 1121 (H.L.) as one of “numerous cases” showing that
parties cannot by contract oust a court of jurisdiction); Scott, 10 Eng. Rep. 1121
(speculating that judicial hostility to arbitration “probably originated in the con-
tests of the different courts in ancient times for extent of jurisdiction, all of them
being opposed to anything that would deprive one of them of jurisdiction”).
153. Morse, 87 U.S. at 451–52.
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[a] man may not barter away his life or his freedom, [sic] or his substantial
rights . . . . He cannot . . . bind himself in advance by an agreement, which
may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at all times and on all
occasions, whenever the case may be presented.154
In the Court’s view, privately negotiated contract provisions could not
trump the role of the public adjudicatory system.  If such contract pro-
visions were enforced, the “regular administration of justice might be
greatly impeded . . . .”155  Soon, courts went on to find that antisuit
covenants, pre-dispute waivers of liability, and forum selection clauses
were similarly barred by the ouster doctrine.156  Only courts, the pre-
vailing opinion went, possessed the ability to “protect rights and to
redress wrongs” because private tribunals or other private customiza-
tions of procedure were prone to “become . . . instrument[s] of injus-
tice, or to deprive parties of rights which they are otherwise fairly
entitled to have protected.”157
B. Mere Contract Law No More: Autonomy and Private
Procedural Ordering
By the late eighteenth century, however, although both the revoca-
bility and ouster doctrines were still in use in American courts, no-
tions of party autonomy were starting to play a greater role in not only
the public conscience but also in the judicial mind.158  At the height of
154. Id. at 451.
155. Id. at 451–52.
156. See, e.g., Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass’n v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, 82 F. 508, 510
(6th Cir. 1897) (finding that a contract stipulating that suits could only be
brought in federal court was void because it “intended to oust the jurisdiction of
all state courts”); Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174, 184
(1856) (refusing to enforce a forum selection provision because forum choice was
fixed by law “upon considerations of general convenience and expediency”);
Meacham v. Jamestown Franklin & Clearfield R.R. Co., 105 N.E. 653, 656 (1914)
(Cardozo, J., concurring) (finding that an arbitration contract is an invalid at-
tempt to oust the jurisdiction of the courts because its purpose is the same as
agreements requiring litigants to submit their case to a foreign court, but noting
that there may be exceptional circumstances warranting enforcement of such fo-
rum selection clauses); Knorr v. Bates, 35 N.Y.S. 1060, 1062 (N.Y. Gen. Term.
1895) (holding that a contractual limitation on the right to sue underwriters on
an insurance policy was unenforceable because “a provision in a contract that the
party breaking it shall not be answerable in an action is a stipulation for ousting
the courts of jurisdiction, and, as such, is void, upon grounds of public policy”).
157. Tobey v. Cty. of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320–21 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845).  Thus, it is
fair to say that the ouster doctrine was justified both based on concerns over indi-
vidual rights, such as those set out in Morse, 87 U.S. at 451–52 and concerns
about extra-individual matters such as “administrative efficiency, separation of
powers, and public faith in the legitimacy of the judiciary.”  David Marcus, The
Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection Clauses in the
Federal Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 973, 995 (2008) (citing and discussing Nute, 72
Mass. 174, as articulating this extrajudicial concern).
158. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105
YALE L.J. 625, 630 (1995) (“Contract has become the dominant doctrinal current
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the revocability and ouster doctrines, contract law was in its infancy,
and most contracts were discrete and simple.159  That began to change
with rapid economic transformations in the American economy.  As
American courts routinely decided increasingly complex contract dis-
putes based on the intentions of the parties,160 the same principles of
autonomy began gaining traction in the context of private procedural
ordering.161  G. Richard Shell identified the trend towards acceptance
of procedural contracts more than twenty years ago in his study of
contracts and the Supreme Court, where he documented the steady
demise of the public policy exception to contract enforcement and, in
particular, of an exception to contractual autonomy that draws from
the special attributes of judicial process.162
Certainly arbitration played a key role in unlocking the potential
of private procedural ordering.163  Businesses saw the potential effi-
in modern American law.”); Walter F. Pratt, Jr., American Contract Law at the
Turn of the Century, 39 S.C. L. REV. 415, 415 (1988) (“During the past century,
contract law, along with most of American society, has undergone a ‘major
transformation.’”).
159. In his article on the history of commercial law in the United States, Professor
Walter F. Pratt, Jr. explains that:
Contracting, like conversation, had in earlier times been rooted in the
past.  People who knew one another and who knew the local market,
insulated as it was from dramatic shifts in the economy, faced little like-
lihood of changes in circumstances that would require elaborate agree-
ments or provoke complex disputes.  Railroads and cities, however,
seemed to disrupt that past by bringing economic uncertainty into the
local markets.  Parties thus faced the tiring prospect of writing detail
upon detail into each agreement if they were to account for every poten-
tial event.
Pratt, supra note 158, at 428–29; see also Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the
Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development of Arbitration in the
United States, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479, 489 (1995) (explaining that the doctrine
of revocability set forth by Lord Coke in Vynior’s Case occurred before the com-
mon law of contracts was fully formed).
160. Instead of being localized and discrete as they had been prior to the turn of the
century, commercial transactions tended to be more complex and regional as well
as national. See Allen Blair, “You Don’t Have to be Ludwig Wittgenstein”: How
Llewellyn’s Concept of Agreement Should Change the Law of Open-Quantity Con-
tracts, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 67, 77–78 (2006).
161. But see Marcus, supra note 157, at 1014 (arguing that, although “[i]ncreased ap-
preciation for freedom of contract and individual autonomy and consent may
have influenced the development of [forum selection clauses,] . . . these considera-
tions played a small part at best, especially when compared to the degree to
which extraindividual considerations shaped the design of clause enforcement
doctrine”).
162. G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 431,
452–56 (1993) (detailing the Supreme Court’s treatment of judicial access clauses
and documenting judicial acceptance of ex ante forum selection clauses).
163. See, e.g., William C. Jones, An Inquiry Into the History of the Adjudication of
Mercantile Disputes in Great Britain and the United States, 25 U. CHI. L. REV.
445, 461–62 (1958) (“Statistics are not available and it is doubtful that they ever
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ciency gains from arbitration, but they were frustrated with court re-
fusal to enforce arbitration agreements.164  Calls for the legal system
to value freedom of contract fueled much of the reform effort.  As Ju-
lius Henry Cohen, the chief draftsman of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), explained, “everybody today feels very strongly that the right
of freedom of contract which the Constitution guarantees to men, in-
cludes the right to dispose of any controversy which may arise out of
the contract in their own fashion.”165
Responding to the interests of the business community, in 1920,
New York broke from traditional English arbitration law by enacting
a statute that enforced pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate, ended the
practice of courts hearing questions of law during the course of arbi-
tration, and provided for only limited judicial review of the final
award.166  In 1925, the U.S. Congress followed New York’s lead by en-
acting the United States Arbitration Act, later renamed the Federal
Arbitration Act.
The Supreme Court would eventually point out that the FAA was a
“response to the refusal of courts to enforce commercial arbitration
agreements.”167  But the Act did far more.  It also represented a more
general step towards recognizing the value of autonomy in procedural
will be, but it is probable that in the nineteenth century arbitration in one form
or another became the most important form of mercantile dispute settlement
. . . in the United States . . . although courts continued, of course, to be used.”);
Stempel, supra note 148, at 275 (“Despite an essentially unchanging judicial hos-
tility toward arbitration, it grew in popularity as the commercial affairs of the
United States became increasingly far flung and complex.”).
164. See, e.g., Atl. Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 F. 319, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (recog-
nizing the general displeasure in the business community with courts’ unwilling-
ness to enforce arbitration agreements in the early twentieth century).
165. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings Before the Sub-
comms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary on S. 1005 and H.R. 646, 68th Cong. 14
(1924) (statement of Julius Henry Cohen).
166. Michael A. Scodro, Arbitrating Novel Legal Questions: A Recommendation for Re-
form, 105 YALE L.J. 1927, 1941 (1996).
167. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 125 (2001); Southland v. Keat-
ing, 465 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1984) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924) (“[T]he
need for the law arises from . . . the jealousy of the English courts for their own
jurisdiction. . . . This jealousy survived for so lon[g] a period that the principle
became firmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it by
the American courts.”).  The statute’s purpose was to ensure that “written provi-
sions or agreements for arbitration of disputes arising out of contracts, maritime
transactions, or commerce among the States or Territories or with foreign na-
tions” would be “valid and enforceable.”  United States Arbitration Act, 43 Stat.
883 (1925).  For excellent accounts of the FAA’s legislative history, see James E.
Berger & Charlene Sun, The Evolution of Judicial Review Under the Federal Ar-
bitration Act, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 745 (2009); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Judicial
Approbation in Building the Civilization of Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV.
1343, 1348 (2009) (providing a brief history of the passage of the FAA).
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choices.  A House Report on the bill introducing the FAA explained its
genesis in concerns about freedom of contract:
Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract, and the effect of the
bill is simply to make the contracting party live up to his agreement. . . . An
arbitration agreement is placed upon the same footing as other contracts,
where it belongs. . . . This bill declares simply that such agreements for arbi-
tration shall be enforced, and provides a procedure in the Federal courts for
their enforcement.168
Numerous commentators as well as Supreme Court decisions have
confirmed the central importance of freedom of contract to the law of
arbitration.169
That progression continued and, with more and more norms of due
process becoming waivable rights, the Warren and Burger Courts em-
braced an expanding range of procedural private ordering options.170
Arguably, the current era customizable procedure was ushered by the
Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co.171  There, the Court addressed enforcement of a forum selection
clause in the context of an international transaction, but the key ratio-
nales of the Court are hardly limited to that context.172
The Bremen revolutionized private procedural ordering by doing
three things.  First, it boldly and decisively discarded the ouster doc-
trine, relegating it to mere anachronism: “[the ouster doctrine] is
hardly more than a vestigial legal fiction.”173  Notably, this sweeping
language by the Court, unconstrained in any way, makes it evident
168. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1–2.
169. THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 49 (5th ed.
2014) (noting that freedom of contract is the “primary legal concept” in the law of
arbitration); see also, e.g., ALAN REDFERN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 265 (4th ed. 2004) (citing UNCITRAL Arbitra-
tion Rules Art. 19(1)) (“Party autonomy is the guiding principle” in arbitration);
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
472 (1989) (noting that arbitration “is a matter of contract”); Granite Rock Co. v.
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 299 (2010) (same); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681 (2010) (“[A]rbitration ‘is a matter of
consent, not coercion.’” (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479)).
170. Dodge, supra note 3, at 734–35 (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
378–79 (1971), Nat’l Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315–16 (1964), Aly-
eska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975), and D.H.
Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187–88 (1972)).
171. 407 U.S. 1, 2 (1972).
172. See, e.g., David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convo-
luted Confluence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congres-
sional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1095 (2002) (describing the case as “a
sea-change in the way private agreement is viewed in relation to procedure”);
William J. Woodward, Jr., Finding the Contract in Contracts for Law, Forum and
Arbitration, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 15 (2006) (observing that the law “changed
dramatically” in The Bremen); Linda S. Mullenix, supra note 138, at 306–07
(“The current doctrine of consensual adjudicatory procedure . . . is based on Su-
preme Court pronouncements in The Bremen.”).
173. 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).
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that, whatever doctrinal logic animated the ouster doctrine, that logic
has outlived its usefulness, even outside of forum selection clauses.
More significantly, and consistent with this expansive revolution in
private process, the case honed in on party autonomy, making the
touchstone for enforcement of forum selection clauses the quality of
the bargaining process.174  Finally, “[e]schew[ing] a provincial solici-
tude for the jurisdiction of domestic forums,” the Court linked party
autonomy with greater predictability and stability in commercial rela-
tionships.175  In other words, the Court reconceptualized procedural
rights, ceasing to look at them from a vertical, individual-government
perspective and focusing, instead, on seeing them from a horizontal,
individual-individual perspective and thus as alienable.176  Parties
should be free, so long as they are bargaining at arms length, to trade
off procedural rights for other benefits.
Importantly, not only did The Bremen radically alter the law of
more than just forum selection clauses in spirit but it also did so in
practice.  At least tacitly, it endorsed party choice over other proce-
dures, since a forum court’s procedural rules will apply.177  By al-
lowing parties to contract for the forum in which their future disputes
will be heard, the Court was in fact allowing parties to shop for bun-
dles of procedural rules that they might prefer.
Following The Bremen, the Court has not looked back during its
march to internalize contract norms and abandon its historic skepti-
cism over the devolution of judicial authority.178  Instead, the Court
has taken multiple opportunities to reinforce the instrumental charac-
174. See id. at 15 (finding that forum selection clauses should be enforced unless the
resisting party can “clearly show that enforcement would be unreasonable and
unjust, or that the clause was invalid”); see also, e.g., Noyes, supra note 5, at 597
(describing the Court as elevating the concept of freedom of contract, thereby al-
lowing parties to bargain about how a dispute will be decided); Linda S. Mullenix
et al., Case One: Choice of Forum Clauses, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 517, 541 (1995)
(arguing that the Court in The Bremen adopted a “strongly stated federal policy
favoring enforceability, subject to usual contract principles”); KEVIN M. CLER-
MONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE: TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND VENUE 85 n.60 (1999)
(stating that The Bremen “shift[ed] from a jurisdictional to a contractual
paradigm”).
175. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 630
(1985) (construing The Bremen).
176. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 931 n.2 (1985) (listing a number of works that consider
the traditional view of property rights and the law).
177. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 & cmt. a (2013).
178. See Resnik, supra note 3, at 598–99 (describing how changes in adjudicatory
practice are shifting the focus of civil procedure from “due process procedure” to
“contract procedure”).
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ter of procedure and its malleability at the hands of parties.179  For
instance, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc.—one of a number of cases putting the nail in the coffin of subject
matter inarbitrability—the Court  made it clear that it would allow
parties to trade off judicial procedures for efficiency:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substan-
tive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an
arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.  It trades the procedures and opportu-
nity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition
of arbitration.180
Although the Court in Mitsubishi framed up the dispute as one involv-
ing unique “international” considerations, “[w]ithin a few years, the
international aura of the reasoning dissipated and eventually van-
ished.”181  Soon, the arbitrability of statutory disputes was no longer
predicated on the international character of the transaction, and the
Court began recognizing that virtually any sort of civil dispute could
be arbitrated.182
Using this same instrumental logic, the Court later broke down
one of the few remaining barriers inhibiting the continued expansion
of private procedural ordering by abandoning any effort to distinguish
between commercial and consumer contracts in Carnival Cruise Lines
v. Shute.183  There, extending its pro-autonomy decision in The
Bremen, the Court brushed past a common law rule that forum selec-
tion clauses in “form contracts” were presumptively unenforceable and
reasoned that such clauses should, instead, be enforced because con-
179. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347–49 (1976) (using a balancing
approach to resolve the question of whether the denial of an opportunity to be
heard violates due process).
180. 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985); see also, e.g., Metro E. Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v.
Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 294 F.3d 924, 928–29 (7th Cir. 2002) (“One aspect of
personal liberty is the entitlement to exchange statutory rights for something
valued more highly.”).
181. THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, TOWARD A NEW FEDERAL LAW ON ARBITRATION 39
(2014); see also, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 624 (1986) (“We granted certiorari primarily to consider whether an
American court should enforce an agreement to resolve antitrust claims by arbi-
tration when that agreement arises from an international transaction.”).
182. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 181, at 39–41.  Professor J. Maria Glover has ar-
gued for a far more restrictive reading of Mitsubishi, contending that the case
sought to foster “claim-facilitative procedures, both as a descriptive matter and a
normative one.”  J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Sub-
stantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3063–64 (2015).  Professor Glover’s argument,
while innovative, does press against the grain of the decision as a whole. See
generally Steven W. Feldman, Italian Colors and Freedom of Contract Under the
Federal Arbitration Act: Has the Supreme Court Enabled Disappearing Claims
and the Erosion of Substantive Law?, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 109 (offering a com-
pelling rebuttal to Professor Glover’s reading of Mitsubishi).
183. 499 U.S. 585, 587–88 (1991).
826 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:787
sumers “benefit in the form of reduced [prices] reflecting the savings
that the [firm] enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be sued.”184
Even the two Supreme Court cases in the past thirty years argua-
bly suggesting some limitation to party autonomy over procedural
choices—Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel and Atlantic Marine
Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court—do more to vindicate this free-
dom than restrict it.
Hall Street Associates v. Mattel has been heralded by some as the
sole decision to invalidate a procedural contract.  But a careful read of
the case shows that, to the contrary, it actually advances the logic of
party autonomy and freedom to tailor procedure.185  In Hall Street,
the Court was faced with a contractual provision expanding the scope
of judicial review of arbitral awards.186  While the Court did invali-
date this provision, holding that the grounds for review of arbitral
awards under the FAA were complete and exclusive,187 the Court did
not even hint that its rejection of the customized procedure sprung
from any concerns over party control of judicial processes.188  Instead,
the Court merely funneled innovation with respect to expanded judi-
cial review of arbitral awards back to States: “[t]he FAA is not the only
way into court for parties wanting review of arbitration awards: they
may contemplate enforcement under state statutory or common law,
for example, where judicial review of different scope is arguable.”189
The Court was not rejecting private procedural ordering at all.190
184. Id. at 594 (“[I]t stands to reason that passengers who purchase tickets containing
a forum clause like that at issue in this case benefit in the form of reduced fares
reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it
may be sued.”).
185. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1408 (2008); see Dodge, supra note 3,
at 738 (describing Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc. as “[t]he Court’s sole in-
validation of a procedural term”).
186. At issue in the case was a contract provision providing that:
[t]he United States District Court for the District of Oregon may enter
judgment upon any award, either by confirming the award or by vacat-
ing, modifying or correcting the award.  The Court shall vacate, modify
or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator’s findings of facts are not
supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator’s conclu-
sions of law are erroneous.
Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1401–02.
187. Id. at 1408.
188. It is worth noting that several Circuits had relied on the dubious and outmoded
notion that contracting for expanded judicial review constituted an impermissible
attempt to control federal court jurisdiction.
189. Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1406.
190. Professor Jamie Dodge, in her seminal article on private procedural ordering
makes this point as well.  In her view,
although the Court narrowly held in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc.
that the Federal Arbitration Act specifically preempted the modification
of the standard of review in the courts, the Court expressly noted that
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Atlantic Marine appears at first glance to support party autonomy,
as the Court enforced a restrictive forum selection clause in the par-
ties’ contract.191  Some commentators have suggested, however, that
the manner in which the Court enforced the clause indicates a skepti-
cism about party autonomy in procedural matters.192  Essentially, the
argument is that, although the Court enforced the clause, it did so on
restrictive grounds.  Many lower courts had taken to enforcing restric-
tive forum selection clauses through motions to dismiss for improper
venue or through motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.193
The Supreme Court in Atlantic Marine rejected this approach, and in-
stead concluded that the proper enforcement mechanism was a motion
to transfer venue.194  Still, the fundamental outcome of the case fa-
vored party choice and there is little reason, as even commentators
sympathetic to a restrictive reading of Atlantic Marine concede, to be-
lieve that the Court intended the decision to signal any sort of concern
about party autonomy over procedural matters.195
In short, since The Bremen, virtually every word from the Supreme
Court suggests that parties have virtually unfettered ability to cus-
tomize procedure.196  Although the Supreme Court has not specifically
endorsed many potential forms of private procedural ordering, with no
notable exceptions the Court’s precedent “treats procedural contracts
as a method for generating procedural efficiencies and increased cer-
tainty of process, resulting in broad enforcement of procedural
terms.”197  The trend of precedent, in short, seems unequivocally to
favor party autonomy and private procedural ordering.
under state law or common law parties may be able to modify the stan-
dard of judicial review.
Dodge, supra note 3, at 738.  This express notation suggests, in her view, that the
Court does not fundamentally think parties should be barred from contracting for
expanded judicial review or similar procedural modifications. See id.
191. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013).
192. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Atlantic Marine and the Future of Party Preference, 66
HASTINGS L.J. 675, 677 (2015) (“The Court’s decision implicitly, though inconsis-
tently, endorses the principle of party subordinance.”).
193. 5B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 62, § 1352 nn.4–5 (citing cases).
194. Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 134 S. Ct. at 579.
195. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 192, at 684, 691 (describing the case as a “small-
triumph” for the principle of party subordinance and recognizing that the Court
was likely “focused on the particular statutory regime of venue” rather than on
party autonomy in procedural matters).
196. Mullenix, supra note 138, at 302–03.
197. Dodge, supra note 3, at 739.  In fact, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Carni-
val Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), the Court has not found that “a
procedural contract violates fundamental fairness.”  Dodge, supra note 3, at 725,
736.
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C. State Courts, Lower Federal Courts, and Procedural
Autonomy
State courts and lower federal courts also seem to agree that par-
ties are free within broad limits to agree on simplified procedures for
the decision of their case.198  In a variety of instances, parties do, in
fact, take advantage of this ability, including when contracting for fo-
rum,199 choice of law,200 appointment of service agents or waiver of
notice,201 and limitation periods.202  Additionally, parties regularly
waive the right to notice and a hearing by using cognovits notes,203
and waive the right to a trial by jury.204 Even procedural require-
ments that might seem “immutable,” such as jurisdictional require-
198. See, e.g., DDI Seamless Cylinder Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Fire Extinguisher Corp., 14
F.3d 1163, 1166 (7th Cir. 1994).
199. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 117, at 1987 tbl.2 (finding that about
53% of a sample of mergers clauses included forum selection provisions); Faith
Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in
Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 118 (2009) (observing that parties “com-
monly” contract over choice of forum “in merger agreements and other highly
negotiated corporate and commercial contracts”).
200. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of
Law, 37 GA. L. REV. 363, 403 (2003) (discussing why most such clauses are en-
forced by courts).
201. Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315–16 (1964) (“[I]t is settled
. . . that parties to a contract may agree in advance . . . to waive notice
altogether.”).
202. See, e.g., 7 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 15:12, at 264–67 (4th ed.
1997) (discussing the enforceability of such clauses); Ronald J. Mann & Travis
Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The Reality of Internet Retail Contracting, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 984, 990 (2008) (discussing the frequency of use of such clauses in
consumer contracts).
203. See, e.g., Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972); D.H. Overmyer Co., Inc. v. Frick
Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972).  The enforcement of contractual confession of judgments
does not violate the defendant’s right to due process provided that there is clear
and convincing evidence that the waiver of notice and hearing was voluntary,
knowing, and intelligently made. D.H. Overmyer, 405 U.S. at 185–87.
204. Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1581, 1595 (2005) (“Most courts will enforce contractual jury waivers.”); Ei-
senberg & Miller, supra note 123 (finding that about 20% of a sample of merger
and acquisition agreements contained a jury trial waiver provision).  Signifi-
cantly, even though the Court has said that the standard for evaluating jury trial
waivers is constitutional rather than contractual, see D.H. Overmyer, 405 U.S. at
185, lower courts seem to focus on the propriety of the bargaining process to the
exclusion of any other concerns, see, for example, IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus.
& Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 2008) (reversing the dis-
trict court’s refusal to enforce a jury waiver embedded in a sales contract on the
view that “[a]s long as the price is negotiable and the customer may shop else-
where, consumer protection comes from competition rather than judicial
intervention”).
2017] CALIBRATING PROCEDURE THROUGH CONTRACT 829
ments, have, in recent years arguably been subject to some
contractual modification.205
The Texas Supreme Court offered a particularly clear justification
for procedural customization outside of arbitration in a jury waiver
dispute between a lessor and two tenants.206  Effectively, the court
argued that allowing parties room to customize public court litigation
was better than shunting parties wanting room to customize out of the
public system altogether an into arbitration.
In the case, Prudential was the building lessor, and the tenants
were Francesco Secchi, a native of Italy, and his wife Jane, a native of
England.  Neither was educated beyond the eighth grade.  The Secchis
argued that jury waivers are contrary to public policy, because they
give nongovernment actors “the power to alter the fundamental na-
ture of the civil justice system by private agreement.”207  The Texas
Supreme Court rejected that argument, noting that precedent already
allows parties to contract for the law that will apply and the forum in
which litigation will take place, and lets them waive the due-process
based requirements for personal jurisdiction.  “Public policy,” the
Court said, “that permits parties to waive trial altogether connected
with this Lease, or any of its provisions” surely does not forbid waiver
of trial by jury.
[I]f parties are willing to agree to a non-jury trial, we think it preferable to
enforce that agreement rather than leave them with arbitration as their only
enforceable option.  By agreeing to arbitration, parties waive not only their
right to trial by jury but their right to appeal, whereas by agreeing to waive
only the former right, they take advantage of the reduced expense and delay
of a bench trial, avoid the expense of arbitration, and retain their right to
appeal.  The parties obtain dispute resolution of their own choosing in a man-
ner already afforded to litigants in their courts.  Their rights, and the orderly
development of the law, are further protected by appeal.  And even if the op-
tion appeals only to a few, some of the tide away from the civil justice system
to alternate dispute resolution is stemmed.208
Like the U.S. Supreme Court, then, state courts and lower federal
courts seem to view procedural autonomy as a hallmark of contractual
freedom, allowing parties the ability to customize procedures to fit
their particular dispute resolution needs.
V. CONCLUSION
I have argued that parties can enjoy significant benefits if proce-
dure is seen as a set of defaults rather than immutable or mandatory
205. Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 2, at 513–14 (noting that recent cases arguably
allow for parties to enlarge the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts and
contract around some constitutional standing barriers).
206. In re The Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004).
207. Id. at 131.
208. Id. at 130.
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rules.  Allowing parties to unbundle off-the-rack procedures in public
courts gives them flexibility to trade off accuracy and efficiency to
meet their ex ante preferences.  Parties can optimize their contracts so
that, given the particular nature of their relationship, they limit op-
portunities for post-dispute opportunism, enhance incentives to per-
form their contractual obligations, mitigate risks, and, to the extent
that a dispute arises, minimize the costs of dispute resolution.  Given
these theoretical benefits, it is tempting to predict that parties will
engage in such fine-tuning of procedure regularly.  The empirical evi-
dence, however, indicates the contrary.  Although parties do engage in
some coarse forms of procedural customization, they do not seem to
consistently tailor procedures, at least before a dispute arises.  One
possible reason for this could be that existing doctrine blocks attempts
at customization.  I have considered this argument, however, and re-
butted it, showing that doctrine not only seems to allow for party cus-
tomization, but fully supports it.  Parties are doctrinally free to modify
procedure in innovative and expansive ways.
This conclusion leaves the fundamental puzzle unanswered, but it
does clarify the promise and peril of procedural contracting, offering a
clearer path to understanding both the practical and normative issues
surrounding the practice.
